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iAbstract
For confidential communication, today, a variety of extremely secure encryption
algorithms are readily available. These techniques, however, always require a secret
key shared between sender and receiver. The only way to exchange such a key
for two distant parties unconditionally secure is quantum key distribution (QKD).
Moreover, a key, once generated using QKD, can be analyzed for its integrity and
discarded – in parts or completely – in case the transmission was intercepted.
The operating distance of QKD systems, however, is limited to a few hundreds
of km due to the attenuation in the channel and detector noise. Yet, satellite based
systems could provide efficient links for global scale QKD. While both classical
optical satellite downlinks and long range terrestrial free-space QKD were shown
successfully, a quantum key exchange with a rapidly moving platform is still missing.
The presented work closes this gap with a first experimental demonstration of a BB84
QKD transmission from an airplane at a speed of 290 km/h to ground.
The experiment could be realized supplementing the system for classical free-
space optical (FSO) communication operated by the German Aerospace Center (DLR)
with QKD hardware: A transmitter for BB84 polarization encoded faint pulse QKD at
a wavelength of 850nm was designed and integrated in the free-space experimental
laser terminal 2 (FELT2) carried by a Dornier 228 turboprop airplane and an
according QKD receiver was mounted to the optical ground station (OGS) located
near Munich, Germany.
A first challenge of this demonstration was to enable sufficient coupling of the
transmitter and receiver telescope. This required an enhancement of the pointing
system as for QKD applications the transmitter power may not be increased to
compensate for high channel attenuation. Further, the polarization encoding
necessitates a precise compensation scheme for mutual rotations of the encoding
bases in the aircraft and on the ground. This was complicated by the moving
pointing mirrors in the FELT2 which gave rise to varying circular polarization
components, too. A third challenge was the integration of the QKD hardware itself
as the host FSO system was never intended to accommodate additional optics.
The quantum key exchange with the aircraft could successfully be accomplished
in a flight campaign over a distance of 20 km. The advanced pointing and tracking
system enabled a stable sifted key rate of 145bit/s for the whole 10min aircraft
passage. The observed quantum bit error ratio (QBER) was as low as 4.8% with a
technical QBER (without detector and background noise) of only 1.8%. This proves
for a precise compensation of the polarization rotations in the quantum channel.
Finally, by integrating QKD hardware into an existing FSO system, the suitability of
QKD as an add-on could be shown.
With the high angular speed of the aircraft the obtained results are representative
for links to satellites in low earth orbit (LEO), high-altitude platforms and
intercontinental planes, which together will form the basis of a global scale trusted
node quantum network for secure communication.
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Zusammenfassung
Für vertrauliche Kommunikation stehen heute eine Vielzahl von extrem sicheren
Verschlüsselungsverfahren zur Verfügung. Diese erfordern jedoch stets einen
geheimen Schlüssel der Sender und Empfänger bekannt ist. Die einzige Möglichkeit
jedoch, einen solchen Schlüssel unbedingt sicher auszutauschen, bietet die Quan-
tenschlüsselverteilung (quantum key distribution, QKD). Darüber hinaus kann ein
Schlüssel, der mit Hilfe der QKD erzeugt wurde, auf seine Integrität untersucht und,
falls die Übertragung abgehört wurde, ganz oder teilweise verworfen werden.
Die Reichweite von QKD-Systemen ist jedoch durch die Kanalabschwächung und
das Detektorrauschen auf wenige 100 km begrenzt. An Bord eines Satelliten hinge-
gen, könnten QKD-Systeme global effiziente Verbindungen ermöglichen. Während
sowohl klassische optische Satellitenlinks als auch terrestrische freiraumoptische
(free-space optical, FSO) QKD über große Distanzen bereits gezeigt wurden, fehlt
ein Quantenschlüsselaustausch mit einer schnellen, mobilen Plattform noch. Die
vorgelegte Arbeit schließt diese Lücke mit einer ersten experimentellen Demonstra-
tion einer BB84 QKD-Übertragung von einem Flugzeug bei einer Geschwindigkeit
von 290 km/h zum Boden.
Das Experiment konnte durch eine Erweiterung des Systems zur klassischen
FSO-Kommunikation des Deutschen Zentrums für Luft und Raumfahrt (DLR) mit
Hardware zur Quantenkryptographie realisiert werden. Dazu wurde ein Sender
für polarisationskodierte BB84 QKD mit abgeschwächten Laserpulsen (Wellenlänge
850nm) entwickelt und in das „free-space experimental laser terminal 2” (FELT2) an
Bord des Flugzeugs (Dornier 228) integriert. Ein passender QKD-Empfänger wurde
an der optischen Bodenstation montiert.
Eine erste Vorraussetzung dieser Demonstration war, eine hinreichende Kopplung
der Teleskope zu garantieren. Dazu war eine Verbesserung der Zielvorrichtungen
nötig, da die Sendeleistung in der QKD nicht angehoben werden kann um hohe
Kanalabschwächung auszugleichen. Weiter erforderte die Polarisationskodierung
eine präzise Kompensation der gegenseitigen Verdrehung der Kodierbasen im
Flugzeug und am Boden. Dies wurde durch die sich bewegenden Zielspiegel des
FELT2 erschwert, durch die auch zirkulare Polarisationskomponenten auftraten. Eine
dritte Herausforderung war die Integration der QKD-Komponenten selbst, da das
FSO-System des DLR nie für zusätzliche Optik vorgesehen war.
Der Quantenschlüsselaustausch mit dem Flugzeug konnte über eine Distanz
von 20 km in einer Flugkampagne erfolgreich durchgeführt werden. Die präzise
Zielsteuerung ermöglichte dabei eine stabile Schlüsselrate (gesiftet) von 145bit/s
während eines ganzen 10-minütigen Vorbeiflugs. Dabei betrug die Quantenbitfehler-
rate (QBER) lediglich 4.8%. Die technische QBER (ohne Detektor- und Hintergrun-
drauschen) von 1.8% zeigt die präzise Kompensation der Polarisationsrotationen
im Quantenkanal. Schließlich unterstreicht die hier erfolgte Integration die Eignung
von QKD zur Erweiterung bestehender FSO-Systeme.
iv
Die Resultate dieses Experiments sind, nicht zuletzt auf Grund der hohen
Winkelgeschwindigkeit des Flugzeugs, repräsentativ für Verbindungen zu Satelliten,
Höhenplattformen und Flugzeugen auf interkontinentalen Strecken, die zusammen
die Basis eines globalen Quanten-Netzwerks zur sicherer Kommunikation bilden
werden.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptography has come a long way from first transposition ciphers , which, almost
4000 years ago, were produced by exchanging letters according to a fixed table
only. Today, modern block ciphers and even asymmetric private/public key schemes
secure an immense amount of global communication. The motivation, however, did
not change over time. Now and then, people want or have to exchange information
in a confidential and secure way. They want to make sure that their opponents –
known or unknown – do not find out about the content of their communication and,
equally important, that the message is authentic, comprising the authenticity of its
sender/receiver as well as its content.
Two weaknesses, however, are common to all conventional schemes, from ancient
times until now: First, for every secret communication, the sender and the receiver,
traditionally called Alice and Bob, have to find a compromise: Depending on their
skills and available technology, they choose a cryptographic protocol with acceptable
effort. In doing so, they will also take into consideration the potential risks of
the information becoming public, and the assumed motivation, skills and technical
possibilities of their adversary. Obviously, false estimations about the means of an
opponent will lead to insufficient security measures and, in fact, all conventional
cryptographic schemes crucially rely on assumptions about the technological and
financial situation of the adversary and on the mathematical complexity of the
algorithm itself. One exception to this argument is an encryption scheme called
one-time pad which was shown to be information theoretically secure, as long as a
key equal in length with the message is used [1]. This excessive key requirement,
however, is also the reason why the one-time pad is only rarely used.
This is connected to the second weakness of conventional cryptographic schemes
which is the secure exchange of a secret key between Alice and Bob: Cryptography
based on publicly known and well tested encryption algorithms combined with a
hard to guess key has proven to enable highest security measures – proprietary
techniques partly relying on security by obscurity often suffered from design flaws
and could be broken within short time. The high security level of modern encryption
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algorithms (e.g. advanced encryption standard (AES) [2, 3]), however, makes the key
exchange the weakest link in the security chain. Moreover, once Alice and Bob have
established a symmetric key, there is no way to determine its integrity. This is
largely independent of the method they chose: If they sent the key written on paper
or stored on a hard drive, they have to trust their couriers and storage facilities to
efficiently prevent the fabrication of copies by an illegitimate party. In case they used
a mathematical technique, for example the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [4] or the
public key method invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA, [5]), to generate
a shared key using an otherwise public channel, then again they have to trust the
assumed computational complexity of the algorithm. This mathematical approach is
usually implemented in today’s encrypted communication over the Internet and the
security of the algorithms is based on the problem of factoring large numbers which
as of today can not be accomplished in polynomial time. The assumed hardness
of this and other mathematical problems exploited in conventional cryptography,
however, could not be proven.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [6–9] offers a solution to the key distribution
problem and thereby enables the application of the information theoretically secure
one time pad. The absolute security of QKD could be proven for a variety of protocols
and the laws of quantum mechanics are the only restriction an adversary is assumed
to be liable to. This is in sharp contrast to the assumptions and estimations made in
case of conventional encryption algorithms. Additionally, using QKD, the amount of
information an eavesdropper may have gained in the key distribution process can be
quantified by measurable parameters – first and foremost the observed transmission
noise. This enables an evaluation of the integrity of a generated key before it is
used to actually encrypt sensitive data. It has to be noted, however, that there
remains the often implicit assumption that a system, while theoretically feasible,
can actually be implemented with reasonable effort as described by the protocol.
Unfortunately, QKD is not immediately compatible with today’s communication
technology as it requires a quantum channel between Alice and Bob. Such a channel
preserves the physical states of the quantum entities, the qubits, usually realized
with photons, sent to generate a secret key.
With a quantum channel over a distance of 30 cm the first demonstration of
QKD [7, 10] in 1989 became the starting point of a rapid development of this new
technology enabling successively longer distances and secure key rates. Soon, also
optical fibers were found to provide efficient quantum channels. Yet, noise, especially
from the detectors, and the increasing attenuation in the quantum channel limit
the maximum distance for a successful quantum key generation in either case –
as a matter of fact, the qubits cannot be amplified on their way. As of today, in
fiber QKD, there are experiments using superconducting single photon detectors to
demonstrate distances up to 250 km [11–15]. In order to exchange secret keys over
even longer distances or to enable QKD networks as demonstrated in [16, 17], trusted
nodes can connect two or more point-to-point links. The only way to overcome this
3trusted node topology and thereby the need for secure switch sites, however, is a
future quantum repeater which is currently under investigation [18–20].
Experiments using a free-space quantum channel established between two
telescopes have similarly pushed the limits in distance and secure key rate. After a
first real live demonstration on the 23 km distance between two mountains [21] and
first daylight key exchanges on 1.6km [22] and 10 km distance [23], soon the direct
line of sight between the two Canary islands Teneriffe and La Palma was discovered
as an ideal testbed. There, on a distance of 144 km, QKD has been performed [24–
26] as well as entanglement distribution [27] and even quantum teleportation [28].
These techniques, recently also demonstrated on a 97 km free-space channel [29, 30],
enable the generation of a shared secret key, too.
The grand goal of long distance free-space QKD is, of course, a satellite based
system acting as a trusted node, which would allow for a key exchange on a global
scale. Enabling QKD on horizontal distances beyond the effective thickness of the
atmosphere, however, is usually considered to be even harder concerning fluctuations
compared to a satellite-to-ground link mainly propagating in vacuum. The results
of earth bound experiments thus often are quoted to evaluate the feasibility of QKD
with satellites [31, 32] and QKD system components for the application in space are
proposed and tested [33].
Yet, all QKD experiments so far were performed with stationary transmitters
and receivers only. Clearly, for satellite based qkd this can only be partly
representative. In classical free-space communications, however, the situation is
different: High bandwidth data links between an aircraft and a ground station
have been demonstrated [34, 35] as well as links to and from satellites in low earth
orbit (LEO) [36–38]. Additionally inter satellite links, both LEO–LEO and inter orbit
to satellites in a geosynchronous orbit (GEO), are already developed [39] to provide
high speed data backbones.
In this work [40, 41], both these worlds – long distance quantum communication
and free-space optical data links to moving platforms – shall be combined in a first
experiment proving the feasibility of QKD from an airplane to an optical ground
station. The demonstration is enabled by the recent advances in both fields and
intends to constitute a major milestone on the way to QKD applications in space.
The aircraft as an experimental platform further allows for an evaluation of the
possibilities and requirements of quantum key distribution with different kinds of
air vehicles. Especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and balloons, which are
proposed to enable temporary communication networks for short time events or in
urban and disaster areas, could be supplemented by QKD capabilities to provide
secure key exchange in addition to data communication. The experiment aims to
facilitate the integration of QKD on all current and future communication devices
operating on a direct line of sight and thus is projected as an add-on to an existing
optical communication system.
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Supplementing an existing communication platform gives rise to several chal-
lenges as the host system, the optical terminal in the aircraft and the ground station
telescope, was initially not intended to support add-ons. Moreover, the classical link
has to remain operational even with the QKD hardware installed. As a consequence,
modifications to the classical components were confined to be least invasive and
compromises had to be adopted in order to meet the space and power limitations
imposed by the host system. Additionally, the airworthiness certification process
demanded for the transmitter hardware to remain unchanged already about nine
months before the flight campaign and also imposed other constraints concerning
laser safety and electrical connections.
Another major challenge are the more accurate pointing requirements to be met
compared to classical free-space communication. While a classical system can, to
some extent, compensate power losses with increased transmitter intensity, this is
not true for quantum communications. Additionally, in contrast to the classical
case, the achievable secure key rates in QKD are directly connected to the channel
attenuation. The QKD beam thus will be collimated much narrower then the classical
communication laser in order to collect as much signal as possible at the receiver’s
aperture, which in turn requires an extremely accurate pointing.
As the polarization of photons is well preserved in the atmosphere even on long
distances [42], this degree of freedom is most often used in free-space quantum
communications to encode information. In a mobile scenario, however, this gives rise
to a third difficulty of the projected experiment: The polarized photons prepared
at the transmitter travel through a system of lenses and mirrors at either end of
the optical link. When they reach the receiver, they appear rotated depending on
the relative orientations of the transmitter and receiver and the according pointing
mirror positions. In addition to these mere spatial rotations, varying birefringence
of optical components when used at different angles of incidence give rise to circular
polarizations, too. In order to still obtain meaningful results from polarization
measurements at the receiver, all these rotations have to be compensated somewhere
in the optical channel. The receiver’s polarization reference frame has to become
equivalent to the reference used for preparation. Therefore, in this work, especially
because of the unpredictable orientation of the aircraft in the presence of wind
and turbulence, a polarization compensation scheme has to be developed and
implemented. It has to be noted, that for future satellite QKD, this task is
investigated theoretically [43], yet, the satellites ephemeris provides very precise
a priori trajectories as a basis for the calculation which are not available in the
aircraft scenario.
In this thesis, after a short introduction to the QKD basics and the BB84 [7]
protocol, chapter 3 describes the experiment hardware consisting of the classical
host system and the QKD add-ons and modifications. The next chapter is dedicated
5to the ground to ground tests and the actual flight campaign while experimental
results are analyzed and discussed in chapter 5 followed by a summary and outlook.
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Chapter 2
Quantum Key Distribution
The properties of single quanta governed by the laws of quantum mechanics open up
new possibilities of information processing and communication. The transition from
classical bits ’0’ and ’1’ to qubits, quantum mechanical two level systems, enables
also the storage of superpositions of the two states.
QKD [6, 8, 9] is the most mature technology in quantum information and also the
first one applied commercially [44]. In QKD, qubits are used to encode and exchange
information over a quantum channel to establish a shared secret in a provably secure
way between two parties traditionally called Alice and Bob. This is enabled by the
quantum mechanically no-cloning theorem and the fact that any measurement on
a quantum entity necessarily makes a possible superposition state collapse to the
measurement outcome. Thus, in contrast to conventional key agreement schemes,
QKD does not rely on any assumptions on the power and capabilities of a potential
attacker.
Another real advantage QKD offers is its ability to provide an upper bound on
the information an eavesdropper may have gained as a function of the observed
transmission noise, the quantum bit error ratio (QBER). This makes it possible to
check an exchanged key for its integrity prior to its application for the encryption
of sensitive data. Conversely, in the classical world, one cannot tell whether a
key is secret, was partly compromised or even copied completely. Moreover, if the
transmitted key turns out to be only partly secure, it is possible to extract a shorter,
yet secure key using classical post processing.
Necessary prerequisites for QKD are a preferably quantum source of randomness
for Alice and Bob, a classical communication channel between them and some small
amount of initially shared secret for authentication. The latter is required to rule
out any man-in-the-middle attack from the beginning. Later in the transmission,
part of the generated key has to be reinvested for this purpose. The term quantum
key growing is sometimes used to stress the necessity for a pre-shared secret and
the fact that QKD is the only way to securely increase the amount of shared secrecy
remotely.
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Further methods of quantum information include for example quantum tele-
portation [45, 46], quantum simulation [47] and most prominently quantum
computation [48, 49], i. e., the development of a quantum computer, which was
shown to enable a significant speedup for certain classical problems and thereby
threatens all public key cryptography schemes. For example, with the help of Shor’s
algorithm [50], numbers can be factorized in sub-exponential time. This has already
been demonstrated experimentally for the number 15 [51, 52].
2.1 BB84 Protocol
The BB84 protocol for quantum key exchange proposed by Charles Bennett and
Gilles Brassard was the first to be invented and also the first to be implemented [10].
Its intuitive approach makes it still the most comprehensible and distinct method to
generate a shared secret key by sending single quanta, i.e., qubits. While these
can be realized with a variety of different quantum entities and according two
level subspaces, the relevant implementation here are photons (with their state
of polarization), which are sent through a free-space quantum channel established
between Alice and Bob.
For the key exchange, Alice and Bob agree on an encoding of the classical bits ’0’
and ’1’ in two orthogonal, and maximally conjugate bases called “rectilinear” (+)
and “diagonal” (×) respectively. The first is defined by the horizontal and vertical
polarization (|H〉, |V 〉), the latter by the polarizations along ±45◦ relative to |H〉
(| + 45〉, | − 45〉). This ensures that a qubit prepared in one basis does not reveal
any information about the encoded bit when measured in the other basis.
The protocol then works as follows: Using two bit of randomness, Alice chooses
a bit value and one of the two bases, × or +. She encodes her qubit accordingly
and sends it through the quantum channel to Bob. He, in the same way, chooses
randomly a basis for measurement and records its outcome ’0’ or ’1’. They
repeat these steps until they have acquired the desired amount of data before they
proceed with the entirely classical post processing: Over the classical channel, Alice
announces which basis she used for every qubit she sent. Bob replies with a list
of time slots in which both have chosen (by chance) the same basis and received a
signal at all. Only these qubits can lead to meaningful results and will form the so
called “sifted key”. The remaining signals are discarded as in case of differing bases,
Bob’s measurement results are completely random.
2.2 Classical Post-processing of the Sifted Key
While the sifted keys of Alice and Bob should in principle be identical, noise will
always cause a certain amount of errors. While these errors normally result from
detector noise, stray light and small misalignments, it is always assumed that an
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eavesdropper is responsible for the complete observed QBER and has gained the
according amount of information. Thus, the sifted key cannot directly be used to
confidentially encrypt a secret message. It is the task of the classical post-processing
to distill a symmetric and secret key from the sifted key obtained in the quantum
transmission.
2.2.1 Error Correction
The process of error correction, also called “reconciliation”, eliminates differing bits
from Alice’s and Bob’s sifted keys to establish actual symmetric keys. However,
this can not be performed without disclosing some information about the sifted key.
This has to be compensated later in privacy amplification and thus reduces the key
length. The minimum amount of data that has to be sacrificed depends on the error
rate e and is given by the binary entropy function H2(e) [53]
H2(e) = −e log2(e)− (1− e) log2(1− e) . (2.1)
However, this is only a theoretical minimum and actual algorithms are designed
to perform as close to this so called Shannon limit as possible. For a long time,
cascade [54] was used in reconciliation being specifically invented for quantum
cryptography. It is designed to disclose as few bits as possible. Recently, however,
protocols often implement low density parity check (LDPC) codes [55, 56]. They
require a good a priori estimation of the error rate, but can then perform extremely
efficient [57].
Another subtlety remains which again costs valuable key bits: All efficient error
correction protocols have a small yet finite probability to fail, in which case Alice’s
and Bob’s keys still differ in one or more bits even after error correction. After the
privacy amplification step to follow, this would result in completely different keys and
thus render the message unreadable for the recipient. Even more important, a key
containing errors might not be covered by security proofs and the cipher produced
with such a key might be vulnerable [58]. Thus, verification of the successful error
correction is an important step of the QKD protocol.
2.2.2 Privacy Amplification
For this stage of the classical post processing a short identical key, shared between
Alice and Bob, is required. Yet, due to the non vanishing QBER, they have to assume
that a possible eavesdropper already has some knowledge about the string. The task
of privacy amplification [59, 60] is to distill a secret key reducing the information of
an adversary to an arbitrarily small amount.
The information that may have leaked to en eavesdropper is upper bounded
again by the binary entropy function H2(e). This means that in total, together with
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the bits disclosed in the error correction process, a secure fraction
R = 1− 2H2(e) (2.2)
of the sifted key can be distilled to be used as a secret key. Yet, this relation
only holds for the ideal protocol with an infinite long sifted key and an optimal
error correction algorithm. In the analysis in chapter 5, the necessary variations to
equation (2.2) will be described.
If this fraction R is positive, this means, if the amount of leaked information
is less then the number of sifted key bits, a secure key can be distilled using two-
universal hash functions [61]. A class of functions which when chosen randomly
are are on average input independent. They reduce the key length as needed and
produce an output string which is maximally dependent on all input bits. As a rule
of thumb, a single bit flip at the input string flips half the bits of the hashed output.
2.2.3 Authentication
While the communication during post-processing can be done publicly, all messages
from Alice to Bob and vice versa have to be authenticated. For a public channel,
this means that both the origin and the content of every message have to be verified.
The authenticity of the origin ensures the identity of the respective sender and
prevents that an illegitimate party can secretly inject messages. For this purpose,
an initially shared secret is inevitable. For absolute security, this affords that Alice
and Bob have at least met once before.
The authenticity of the content guarantees that the message was not altered on
its way and thus is still identical to the transmitted version.
Both these tasks can be accomplished information theoretically secure by
authentication protocols such as [62]. They need, however, a non negligible amount
of key (in the beginning from the pre-shared secret) to agree on a secret, two-
universal hash function [61] and to encrypt the hash tag, i.e., the result of the hash
function when applied to the message.
2.2.4 Realistic Devices
Originally, idealistic implementations were considered by protocol security proofs [63,
64]. The theoretic models for QKD systems originally did not incorporate any
imperfections or experimental necessities of real devices like noise, multi photon
signals, asymmetries in the detector channels, finite data sets, etc. However, there
are constantly new proofs developed which incorporate many characteristics of
real world devices and show up ways to handle them in the privacy amplification
step [9, 65–69].
Still, imperfect or even controllable detectors at Bob’s site or so called “side
channels” like insufficient quality of the Alice state preparation [70] are often a major
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vulnerability and some of them could even been effectively exploited experimentally,
which is referred to as “quantum hacking” [71–75]. These demonstrations, however,
never do nor can they target the protocols but always the specific hardware. The
vulnerabilities used can in principle be eliminated as the underlying theory is proven
to be secure. Yet, an “unconditional secure” key exchange still remains to be
demonstrated [76] and also throughout this work, there will be details pointed out
that spoil the security of the key exchange in this demonstration.
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Chapter 3
Experiment Setup
The realization of QKD from an airplane to a ground station naturally breaks down
into two branches: First, a classical system has to establish and maintain a stable,
optical link between the communication partners. Second, a QKD transmitter can
use this link as a quantum channel to exchange qubits with a receiver on the other
side. Therefore, it is obvious to approach this experiment as an integration of
quantum hardware with a system for classical airborne laser communication.
This work [40, 41], thus, was enabled by a collaboration with the German
Aerospace Center (DLR) in Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany. The free-space experimental
laser terminal 2 (FELT2, fig. 3.1) mounted in a Dornier 228 turboprop short
take-off and landing type aircraft and the optical ground station (OGS, fig. 3.2)
of the DLR’s Institute of Communications and Navigation constitute an ideal
classical host system [34, 77]. Initially built for high speed data communications
in large area survey scenarios, it is able to provide Fast Ethernet data rates
over a stable optical channel for distances of up to 120 km. Moreover, the OGS
located in Oberpfaffenhofen near Munich, Germany already demonstrated laser
communications with satellites in LEO [36] and a stratospheric balloon [78].
To make the DLR system capable of exchanging quantum keys, a transmitter
for polarization encoded, faint pulse QKD according to the BB84 protocol [7] at a
wavelength of 850nm was developed and integrated.
The chosen polarization encoding was already demonstrated to be robust also
under non-lab conditions [21, 23, 25] – especially when compared with techniques
requiring stable interferometers for state generation and analysis. Moreover, for
polarization encoding it is not necessary to couple the received light into single
mode fiber, which would certainly introduce severe losses. However, in this mobile
scenario, polarization encoding necessitates a scheme for compensation of the
constantly changing effective birefringence of the optical channel. This results
from the varying relative orientation of transmitter and receiver and especially the
pointing mirrors. The polarization compensation will be discussed in section 3.5.
Depolarization and consequently noise due to the atmospheric propagation of the
13
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: The free-space experimental laser terminal 2 (FELT2) mounted
in the aircraft. a: Dornier Do 228 turboprop aircraft used to carry out this
experiment. The inset magnifies the optical dome underneath the aircraft
fuselage housing the coarse pointing assembly (see fig. 3.4). b: The terminal
inside the aircraft cabin covered by the white safety hood. In the foreground,
the rack with power supplies and laptops is visible.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.2: The optical ground station (OGS) Oberpfaffenhofen. a: The
telescope with the framework covered to reduce background noise from stray
light. b: The optical breadboard attached to the back of the main mirror. The
board is moving with the telescope. It was covered in black tissue during the
experiment.
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photons is not to be expected [42]. Dielectric coatings of the optical elements and
especially the dicroic mirrors, however, are a source of noise due to small polarization
dependent properties.
The qubits in this experiment are mimicked by Poissonian pulses with a mean
photon number per pulse of 0.5 and special care was taken to calibrate and control
this intensity. Nevertheless, there is a non negligible fraction of pulses containing
more then one photon. This requires a decoy state protocol extension [79–81]
necessary to become robust against attacks on the poissonian photon number of the
faint pulses [82]. In this first demonstration, however, this was not implemented.
Yet, all parameters necessary to judge the QKD system’s performance assuming an
additional decoy extension are accessible and thus the achievable secure key rate
can be calculated for the decoy state method, too.
At the time of this experiment, data communication was possible unidirectionally
only. Therefore, the optical link could unfortunately not be used as the classical
channel for sifting and post processing, as this demands for bidirectional operation.
Current development of the system, however, aims to implement bidirectional links,
too. Nevertheless, the classical data link was usable even with the QKD extension
implemented in the DLR system, and could be applied to synchronize the QKD
hardware aboard the airplane and at the ground.
3.1 DLR Host System Hardware
Before add-ons and modifications for this experiment are described in detail, in
this section, a brief overview of the host system is given. For clarity, figure 3.3
shows a block diagram of the hardware and also indicates, the QKD components and
interfaces.
3.1.1 Flight Terminal
The airborne terminal houses the optical breadboard mounted shock insulated to the
seat rails of the cabin above a tunnel through the aircraft fuselage. On the outside, a
motorized Kepler telescope (coudé path, see fig. 3.4) is mounted in an optical dome.
The breadbord contains everything that is needed for the operation of the optical
link. Namely optics, detectors and an inertial measurement unit (IMU) for pointing
and tracking, laser diodes and a fiber amplifier for data transmission and further
electronics like an embedded computer, ultra high frequency (UHF) modem and a
variety of sensors. In flight, the system has to be covered and is then controlled
via Ethernet connections using a laptop. The data signal to modulate the laser is
interfaced differentially with logic voltage levels according to low-voltage positive
emitter-coupled logic (LVPECL). The communication laser simultaneously serves as
a beacon for the ground station to track on. The setup of the flight terminal as
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Figure 3.3: Block diagram of the DLR host system with the integration of
the QKD hardware indicated (colored boxes). Laser diode and erbium doped
fiber amplifier (LD EDFA), inertial measurement unit (IMU), digital signal
processor (DSP), wide field of view (WFoV) camera, narrow field of view
(NFoV) camera, four quadrant diode (4QD), coarse pointing assembly (CPA),
voice coil mirror (VCM), fiber laser (FL), and receiver front-end (RFE).
modified for this experiment will be described in section 3.3. Figures 3.5 and 3.9
give an overview of the terminal optics and control system.
3.1.2 Optical Ground Station
The ground station is located on the rooftop of a DLR building next to the special
airport Oberpfaffenhofen. The 40 cm Cassegrain telescope is azimuth-elevation
mounted in a clam shell type housing (see fig. 3.2). This allows in principle for
an unrestricted observation in the full hemisphere1. Behind the main mirror an
optical breadboard moving together with the telescope is attached. All optical
components for communication, tracking and beam analysis are mounted there. Two
fiber collimators are attached right and left of the main mirror, emitting the beacon
laser beams, the airplane can track on. The diversity gained from two beacons,
which cannot be resolved by the FELT2 optics, improves the pointing stability in the
presence of scintillations. A more detailed discussion of the OGS as tailored for this
experiment is presented in section 3.4. An overview of the ground station is given
in figure 3.6 hardware.
1In the north, the view was obscured below a certain height due to the buildings superstructure.
This was, however, not hindering the experiment, as the airspace regulations required the aircraft
to operate south of the OGS anyway.
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Figure 3.4: Section view of the tunnel and the optical dome illustrating
the shock insulating mounting (SM) of the optical breadboard and the coudé
beam path between the lenses of the Kepler telescope: For azimuthal rotation
all mirrors (M(A)) rotate together around the vertical axis. The elevation
angle, limited to a maximum of 5◦ above the horizon, is defined by the angular
position of the mirrorMA around the horizontal axis. Fine and fast corrections
to the pointing are enabled by the voice coil mirror (VCM). A specialty of
the coudé beam path is the rotation of the field of view with the azimuth
angle. This will also be apparent in the polarization compensation later. The
two lenses (L) act as a factor 2 beam expander for the terminal beacon at
λ = 1550nm.
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3.1.3 Additional Radio Links
Apart from the optical link, the DLR communication system is equipped with an
UHF modem that allows for bidirectional data communication at a rate of 9600bit/s.
This link is realized with a small helix antenna underneath the aircraft fuselage and a
tracking Yagi-antenna on the ground. The speed is sufficient to transmit the aircraft
GPS position, orientation and heading to the ground station with an update rate
of 5Hz. Communication and coordination of the experiment between the ground
station operators and the crew aboard the aircraft was mainly accomplished via
satellite phones.
3.2 Pointing and Tracking
Establishing and maintaining a stable and efficient optical channel was the main
task of the classical host system. In order to acquire a link, at first, the OGS receives
the aircraft GPS position via the UHF link and aims its telescope at the according
direction. Thereby, the aircraft is illuminated with the beacon lasers attached to
the OGS telescope.
At the same time, the FELT2 calculates the direction to the OGS with the help of
the on-board inertial measurement unit (IMU) and the CPA performs a scan around
this direction. To gain some robustness against other light sources in the vicinity of
the OGS, the beacon lasers are modulated with 2 kHz. Once the OGS beacon is in
the field of view (FoV) of the FELT2 InGaAs-camera (FoV 48mrad), coarse tracking
begins to keep the spot in the center using the DC brush-less motors that drive the
coudé mechanics.
Now, the FELT2 beacon (divergence 3mrad), which is also modulated to transmit
the payload data, illuminates the OGS. Thereby, the CPA InGaAs-camera mounted
to the OGS telescope frame with its FoV of 12.8mrad can track the aircraft.
This pointing and tracking setup provides a mean pointing error of 500µrad.
For classical communication from the aircraft to the ground, this prove to be
sufficient and the demonstration of Ethernet speeds over a distance of 120 km was
accomplished in this configuration [34].
3.2.1 Fine Pointing
In classical communications, the transmitter power can be adjusted in a wide range
to overcome the channel attenuation. Moreover, the available power allows for wide
beam divergences, which produce a large footprint on the ground. This leads to less
critical pointing requirements while the necessary signal power at the receiver can
still be maintained. When performing a quantum key exchange, however, this is not
possible as one has to adhere to the low mean intensities of less than one photon
per pulse: Only the single photon pulses can be used for key generation and their
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Figure 3.5: Photo and simplified scheme of the FELT2 terminal setup. the voice coil
mirror (VCM) reflects the light to and from the motorized telescope underneath the aircraft
(fig. 3.4) to the coupling block (CB, fig. 3.16). There, a dichroic mirror (DM) overlaps
the incoming beacon with the terminal beacon, which passes through a 4mm hole and
the QKD beam from the Alice module (fig. 3.9). The incoming light is reflected at the
CB, spectrally filtered (IF) and, after a beam splitter (BS), focused (L) onto a quadrant
diode (Q) and an InGaAs-camera respectively. These are part of the two control loops for
pointing and tracking: 1. (green) The coarse pointing assembly (CPA) consisting of the
InGaAs-camera, the terminal controller (CPU) and the motorized telescope in the optical
dome. 2. (blue) The fine pointing assembly (FPA) consisting of the quadrant diode, a
digital signal processor (DSP) and the VCM.
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Figure 3.6: Simplified scheme of the OGS telescope and optics. After a
collimation lens (L) and the piezo actuated mirror (PM), the incoming light
is spectrally divided at the dichroic mirror (DM). The 1550 nm light from the
FELT2 beacon is analyzed by a narrow field of view (NFoV) InGaAs-camera
the 850 nm QKD beam is compressed (BC), polarization corrected by the set
of motorized wave plates (WP) and focused into the bob module (fig. 3.17).
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fraction in all pulses would rapidly vanish if the pulse intensity was increased (see
§ 5.3.1).
It is, thus, crucial that the link efficiency is maximized by a small beam
divergence and a stable pointing. Therefore, an additional FPA was developed
and installed by the DLR both in the FELT2 and the OGS [83]. The complete
setup visualizing the fine and coarse pointing control loops of the FELT2 is shown in
figure 3.5 and the configuration at the OGS is depicted in figure 3.6, respectively.
For the FELT2 the FPA [84] consists of a 1mm quadrant diode2, a DSP and a
voice coil actuated mirror. In analogy to the coils in loudspeakers, the term “voice
coil” describes an electric coil within a static magnetic field which tilts the mirror
depending on the electric current running through the coil.
At the ground station, the FPA is realized with an InGaAs-camera (FoV 960µrad),
a piezo actuated mirror and a computer system to close the control loop. In order
to increase the bandwidth of this regulation, only a small window is actually read
from the camera sensor at a frame rate of 400Hz and analyzed to find the pointing
deviation. The effective focal length of 4m and the 30 µm pixel pitch of this camera
result in an angular resolution of 7.5 µrad/pixel.
For both systems – the flight terminal and the ground station counterpart – it
has to be stressed, that these fine and coarse control loops only operate locally.
This means, they only correct for errors of the receiving direction, i.e., the “visual
ray”. Here, the term “local” refers to the fact that both, the position sensitive device
acquiring the error signal and the respective steering mirror to compensate these
errors are at the same end of the communication link. The transmitted beams are
adjusted only once to be parallel to this visual ray on a testbed and there is no
control loop for online compensation of any residual misalignment possible.
3.2.2 Beacon and QKD Beam Coalignment
The pointing method described above crucially relies on the parallel alignment of
the incoming beacon when it hits the center of the quadrant diode or the FPA camera
and the outgoing laser beam. In other words, one has to ensure manually that the
transmitters of each system actually point into the exact same direction its receivers
operate on. The straight forward strategy for calibration is to track a fixed target
emitting a beacon laser and adjust the own beacon to hit this target, too. With
increasing distance, of course, this adjustment gets more and more precise as angular
errors result in increasingly larger displacements.
For the beacon lasers of the FELT2 and the OGS, however, this coalignment is only
moderately critical due to their wide divergences: The FELT2 laser can be calibrated
on a distance of 50m where it already produces a beam diameter of 15 cm and the
OGS beacons are overlapped with the receiver direction using its coarse tracking
2The effective focal length of the optical system focussing on the quadrant diode is 300mm.
This corresponds to a FoV of 3.3mrad
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camera on the wall of a building about 1 km away. Together with the large power
range of the respective sources, the wide beam divergence ensures that even with
slightly misaligned beacon lasers, the opposite side can still receive a sufficiently
strong signal.
Yet, for the QKD beam both these arguments fail: Neither can one afford a wide
divergence which leads to signal loss at the receiver aperture nor increase the pulse
intensity. Thus, for a successful key exchange, a most accurate coalignment is crucial.
Precision kinematic mirror mounts with enhanced stability are therefore used to
couple the Alice beam onto the pointing axis and to provide the least susceptibility
to vibrations and shocks. Still, the coalignment of the QKD beam emerged to be a
major challenge of this experiment as is described later in chapter 4.
3.3 The airborne QKD Transmitter – Alice
To keep the QKD add-on as modular as possible, the design intention for the
transmitter was a self contained module that could also be integrated into other
optical systems or used in QKD only experiments.
In this demonstration, the flight terminal was chosen to host the QKD trans-
mitter, called the Alice module. This decision is based on the available telescope
apertures of the flight terminal (30mm) and on the ground station (40 cm) to achieve
maximum coupling. Sending the qubits in this direction is favorable as the strongest
fluctuations of the atmosphere are near the ground and then occur at the end of the
quantum channel. There, their effect on the beam direction is less severe. Moreover,
the collection efficiency of the 3 cm aperture is worse in the reverse scenario or would
impose excessive demands on the tracking accuracy.
The flight terminal initially was not intended to host additional hardware.
Therefore, spacing for the Alice implementation was rather tight. Additionally, the
free-space optical path within the terminal had to be kept short to maximize the
mechanical stability of the QKD source relative to the classical optical detectors
responsible for pointing and tracking. Consequently, the solution depicted in
figure 3.5 is a compromise of these considerations with spacing constraints and the
necessity to keep some parts of the classical system removable with the carefully
aligned QKD hardware installed: Some screws for the assembly of the terminal in
the aircraft are hidden underneath the main coupling block and the voice coil mirror.
Yet, in the chosen implementation, the system is sensitive to a bending of the optical
breadboard as this affects the classical and the quantum part differently.
For the actual overlapping of the QKD beam with the existing optics, the so
called coupling block of the classical system was chosen. This component, at the
same time, defines the maximum QKD full beam diameter within the terminal to
7.5mm and requires an off axis alignment. In section 3.3.4, the coupling of the QKD
beam will be explained in more detail.
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While shock mounts are used to maximally decouple the optical setup from the
aircraft fuselage (visible in fig. 3.4), during taxiing these mounts are frequently driven
to their hard stops which results in severe shocks to the optical setup. In flight a
significant amount of vibration was to be expected, too, and a detailed analysis
reveals the rotating four blade propellers as the main source of mechanical noise
at 25.4 Hz and 101.4Hz (the vibration spectrum is available in [34]). Therefore, a
first concern in the design of the QKD transmitter was the mechanical stability even
under harsh conditions.
In addition to the QKD operation mode, the Alice module was equipped with the
ability to emit a continuous wave (cw) or slowly modulated laser beam with (relative)
high intensity (up to≈ 4×1.3mW) in order to facilitate first link acquisitions and the
pointing fine tuning in-flight. This could be achieved by mounting the attenuator,
which reduces the pulse intensities for QKD operation to the single photon level, on
a remote-controlled servo arm (see fig. 3.10). Additionally, a photodiode was placed
on this arm and could be brought into the beam path for verification and electronical
recalibration of the pulse intensities in flight.
3.3.1 Alice Module Electronics
The Alice electronics are grouped in two devices: The voltage generation from the
12V supply provided by the host system and the actual control board integrated
into the Alice module, respectively. The former contains voltage regulators for 5V
and 3.3V with capacitive and inductive filtering and is separated to reduce the heat
input and noise contamination into the main module. Figure 3.7 shows a block
diagram of the main board. A micro controller (ATmega324p) interfaces between the
USB port (FT232r) and the field-programmable gate array (FPGA) (SPARTAN 3e)
and controls all periphery components like the servo arm and the laser driver bias
and modulation currents. Additionally, it collects system health data like operating
voltages and temperatures of the electronics and the Alice module chassis. Finally,
it controls the self calibration for precise QKD pulse intensities.
Unfortunately, the Alice pulse repetition frequency of 10MHz could not directly
be transmitted for synchronization via the optical link due to its bandwidth
limitations. Therefore, the 100MHz signal which clocks the FPGA is fed to the
classical system for modulation of the data and beacon laser. In section 5.1.1 the
synchronization will be described in more detail.
Generation of Short Pulses
The short pulses fed to the laser drivers are produced directly in the FPGA: The
main clock signal of 100MHz is delayed in a so called digital clock manager (DCM)
and XOR-ed with the original clock. The pulse width of the resulting signal is
basically the DCM delay and can be programmed via the USB connection in slightly
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Figure 3.7: Block diagram of the Alice module main electronics. The FPGA
generates short pulses in a pseudo random pattern of adjustable length to
feed the laser drivers. These are programmed individually for a DC bias and
additional modulation current with analog values from the 8 channel digital
to analog converter (DAC). The main clock is derived from a 100MHz crystal
and forwarded by the FPGA to the host system for synchronization with the
ground station. The micro controller (µC) manages communication with a
laptop over USB and handles the temperature sensors, the servo motor, the
real time clock (RTC), the DAC and the programming of parameters into
the FPGA. Moreover, an internal ADC in the micro processor measures the
voltage of the reverse biased photo diode. Peripheral connections: universal
asynchronous receiver and transmitter (uart), serial peripheral interface (spi),
pulse width modulation (pwm), inter-integrated circuit (I2C).
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varying steps of approximately 20 ps length. Still in the FPGA, the short pulses are
distributed to four AND-gates realized in look-up tables which control the laser diode
to fire and at the same time reduce the repetition rate to 10MHz. The performance
of the FPGA gates, however, limits the minimum pulse width at full amplitude of
the laser driver output to about 850ps. With this setting, the laser pulses produce
a 1 ns (FWHM) pulse as detected by an avalanche photo diode (APD) (see fig 3.8).
Deconvolution with the APD jitter of 400 ± 50 ps [85] results in a true laser pulse
width of 0.9ns resembling the electronic pulse length.
In the beginning dedicated adjustable delay integrated circuits (ICs) for the
generation of the short pulses and for compensation of time shifts between each
of the four channels were projected, however, they could not be populated on the
circuit board in this experiment because of their power consumption. The introduced
heat into the module could not have been exchanged with the ambiance outside the
FELT2. As a result, the pulses for each diode are individually shifted relative to
the 10MHz beat (see fig. 3.8). While, in this stage of the experiment, this can be
corrected in the post processing (see section 5.1.2), for a secure key, however, it is
vital to maximally overlap the emitted pulses in every degree of freedom and avoid
any distinguishability which could lead to side channels [70–72].
Pseudo Random Bit Sequence
In principle, true random numbers have to be used to generate the qubit sequence
as demanded by the protocol. Only then, a secure key can actually be produced.
Yet, as the host system provided only unidirectional communication, the qubits were
prepared according to a pseudo random bit Sequence (PRBS). This allowed for a
fast and easy sifting of the received signal even without classical communication: At
the ground station, the used PRBS was known and Bob could easily find the correct
offset by a cross correlation.
This was realized by the implementation of a 16 bit linear feedback shift register
(LFSR) [86] in the FPGA with a reset counter programmable for a pattern length
between 4 bit and 255bit. Unfortunately, during the flight tests, which started with
a consecutive pattern of all four diodes only, there was no time left to try longer
PRBS sequences as well.
Laser Pulse Intensity
The exact brightness of the pulses is determined by two parameters that are
controlled with two currents iB and iM into the laser driver ICs. They set a bias
current IB = 85×iB through the laser diodes and a modulation current IM = 85×iM ,
added to IB during a pulse. Both iB and iM are adjusted individually for all four
drivers by the micro controller via an eight-fold DAC. A series resistor Rser translates
the DAC voltage UDAC to a current into the drivers and its value determines the
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Figure 3.8: Alice laser pulses of the four laser diodes measured as a time
histogram of APD pulse delays relative to the 10MHz repetition frequency.
Note that this measurement includes the APD temporal jitter of 400 ± 50 ps.
The individual delays occur because the delay ICs could not be used due to
their power consumption. The slightly varying pulse length is due to different
diode and coupling efficiencies and according different modulation values for
the laser drivers.
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maximum for IB and IM respectively. As the programming pins of the laser driver
IC are kept at 1.2V, the output currents are calculated according to
IB,M =
1.2 V − UDAC
Rser
× 85 . (3.1)
For increased precision and stability, the full DAC resolution of 12 bit is mapped to
voltages from 0V to 1.25V and UDAC is derived from a dedicated voltage reference IC.
While Rser for the modulation current is chosen for the maximum output
modulation of up to 85mA, the series resistors for the bias are selected to provide
the full resolution for current values up to 21mA in order to allow for precise
setting below and at the laser threshold of the diodes. Additionally, for bright
beam operation, the micro controller can bypass the bias DAC programming with a
FET transistor to set the maximum allowed laser diode current of 35mA.
3.3.2 Alice Module Optics
To implement the BB84 protocol, pulses with four polarizations equally distributed
on a great circle of the poincaré sphere have to be prepared. As laser diodes are
intrinsically linearly polarized well (typically 1:1000), it is straight forward to use
four diodes with their polarization transformed to the states |H〉, |V 〉 and | + 45〉,
| − 45〉 for the two encoding bases as described in section 2.1. A schematic overview
of the setup is presented in figure 3.9 and a stereoscopic view is shown in figure 3.10.
BB84 State Preparation
In the Alice module the four laser diodes are mounted in collimation packages, which
allow for a precise collimation using an aspheric lens with f = 11mm focal length.
The diodes were selected to have similar emission spectra. Their nominal emission
wavelength is 850nm at 10mW of laser power, figure 3.11 shows their spectra in
pulsed operation. The variations in their wavelength distributions will have to be
eliminated by a narrow interference filter to make all four diodes indistinguishable
and to disable side channel attacks on the qubit wavelength. However, in order
to achieve stable pulse intensities, this would require to control the laser diode
temperatures and thus, was not implemented here.
Each pair of diodes is rotated by 90◦ against each other and their light is combined
using a polarizing beam splitter. For the diagonal bases, a half wave plate rotates the
polarization of one pair of diodes by 45◦ before both beams are combined on a beam
splitter and directed to a spatial filter. The resulting polarizations were measured
with the Alice module mounted in the FELT2 after the terminal dome using the
polarimeter. In table 3.1, the resulting angles are listed. As the worst deviation
of 2.2◦ from the nominal angle would result in an error rate of only 0.15%, there
is no significant contribution to the total QBER to be expected due to the state
preparation.
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Figure 3.9: Optical setup of the QKD transmitter (Alice module, see also
fig. 3.10 for an isometric view). Four Laser diodes (H, V, +45◦, -45◦) are
mounted in collimation tubes perpendicular to the optical breadboard. Their
light is combined using two polarizing beam splitters (PBS) and a simple beam
splitter cube (BS). A half wave plate (λ/2) is used for the basis rotation from
{H,V } to {±45◦}. A spacial filter, built from the same collimation tube with
a 5 µm pinhole in a laser diode dummy package (fig. 3.12) selects the mode to
be collimated by the final lens (f = 18mm). The servo arm can optionally
insert the attenuator (ND) or the Photodiode (PD) before the light is directed
to the coupling block (CB, see fig. 3.16). The four mirrors (M) on the right
allow for an assembly perpendicular to the breadboard and, together with the
degrees of freedom of the collimation tubes, enable the coupling through the
spacial filter.
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Figure 3.10: CAD render image of the Alice module optical setup as detailed
in figure 3.9. One can see the four laser diode collimators (LD), the normal (BS)
and polarizing (PBS) beam splitters, the quarter wave plate (λ/2), the spatial
filter (SP), the servo arm and the mirrors used for beam alignment (M).
Between these two mirrors, the beam passes the servo arm with the attenuator
and the calibration photo diode. The electronics and most of the structure is
hidden to reveal the optics within. The module has to be mounted elevated as
the fiber amplifier of the classical system is located between the two support
columns.
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Figure 3.11: Spectra of the four laser diodes in pulsed mode mounted in
the Alice module normalized for equal emission power. Registered with a
spectrometer coupled to the Alice module output.
Table 3.1: Measurement of the Alice polarization states after the optical
dome of the terminal.
laser diode pol. azimuth pol. elevation linear pol. error
(◦) (◦) (◦)
| − 45〉 -46.1 0.2 -1.1
|V 〉 89.4 0.1 -0.6
| + 45〉 47.2 0.1 2.2
|H〉 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
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Figure 3.12: Dummy laser diode package with pinhole mounted in place of
the laser emitter. For spatial filtering another laser diode collimation tube is
used, equipped with this dummy diode. This prove to be a compact solution
for a stable mounting of the pinhole while still providing the necessary degrees
of freedom to adjust the accepted beam divergence and direction.
Spatial Filtering and Collimation
For the security of the QKD transmission, it is essential that the modes of the four
laser diodes are indistinguishable and a setup using different diodes for some or all
of the polarization states is intrinsically prone to state preparation side channels.
For the spatial degree of freedom, this vulnerability can be avoided by filtering
the combined light of the diodes with a short piece of single mode fiber. Yet,
this causes unpredictable polarization rotations if the fiber is bended or otherwise
stressed. Nevertheless, in [70, 87], such a filter with temperature stabilization
could be demonstrated. The space and power requirements as well as the desired
transmittance, however, do not allow an adoption of this technique here. Therefore,
a free-space spatial filter was implemented for this experiment as this also promises
to be more robust against temperature changes and mechanical vibrations. However,
true indistinguishability of the four diodes had to be sacrificed and the according
side channel remains to be closed at this stage of the experiment.
The spatial filter is realized focusing the light on a d = 5µm pinhole, which is
mounted in a laser diode dummy package (fig. 3.12). Thereby, the same collimation
package as for the laser diodes can be used in reverse. This allows for the precise
alignment of the focusing and the filter axis. As the diffraction limited waist of the
focusing lens (f = 11mm) is slightly smaller than the pinhole diameter, best results
were obtained slightly out of focus. Then, the center maximum of the Airy diffraction
pattern behind the circular aperture nicely approximates a Gaussian beam profile.
After the spatial filter, the pinhole diffraction pattern is collimated by an f =
18mm aspheric achromat (diameter 9mm). As the subsequently available aperture
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Figure 3.13: Diffraction pattern (red) calculated for a 5 µm circular pinhole
in a distance of 18mm and an approximated Gauss peak (blue) of the same
width.
in the FELT2 terminal is limited to 7.5mm (see fig. 3.16), the focal length f is
chosen such that the first minimum of the pinhole diffraction pattern has also the
same 7.5mm diameter. Figure 3.13 shows the calculated diffraction pattern for a
5 µm pinhole in the distance f . The resulting collimated beam has a diameter of
5.1mm at 1/e2 level.
Figure 3.14 representatively displays the beam profiles of the four diodes as out
of the Alice module and without further optics (the exit aperture is defined by the
collimation lens holder with a diameter of 8mm). They were captured on a canvas in
a distance of 50m using a linear CCD camera. Variations of the power distribution in
the beam are due to non planar wave fronts in the pinhole diameter and are sensitive
to mechanical stress on the Alice module framework and temperature changes of the
structure. This might be improved with a still smaller pinhole. Yet, a smaller pinhole
was not used here to avoid a possible blockage during the experiment by small dirt
particles in the rough and possibly dusty environment to be expected during the
ground to ground tests, the assembly in the aircraft, and the flight campaign.
The power transmission of the spatial filter was reasonably stable at about 20%.
Loosing half of the laser power at the beam splitter, this leads to 1mW cw power at
the Alice module output for each laser diode at its nominal maximum power.
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Figure 3.14: Modes of the four laser diodes registered in a distance of 50m
behind the spatial filter on a canvas using a linear CCD camera. The cross
marks a fixed position on the screen.
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Finally the telescope implemented in the FELT2 coarse pointing assembly widens
the beam and at the same time reduces its divergence. A beam at the design
wavelength of 1550nm is expanded in the telescope by a factor of 2. For the QKD
beam at 850nm, this means, it has to enter the telescope slightly divergent in order to
leave it collimated. An optical simulation (Zemax) resulted in a final beam diameter
at the telescope output of 12.2mm at 1/e2 level. For a perfect Gaussian beam, this
would result in a diffraction limited divergence of 88 µrad (full angle). Due to the
constraints of the host system, the QKD beam can enter the telescope only parallel
to its axis (shifted by ≈ 4mm, see fig. 3.16 in § 3.3.4). As a consequence, the beam
is also slightly cut by the exit aperture of 30mm. Therefore, a diffraction limited
divergence is not to be expected and the actual value is determined experimentally
over a distance of 300m (see section 4.2.2).
Attenuation
In contrast to previous four or eight laser diode implementations of a BB84 QKD
transmitter [16, 25, 87–89], the combination of the laser diode modes on the one hand
and the attenuation to mean intensities below one photon per pulse on the other hand
could be separated in the present design. This makes mean pulse intensities from 0
to a few million photons per pulse possible by selecting the according attenuating
filter and additionally offers the possibility to emit a bright beam for alignment
purposes.
Therefore, the final optical component of the Alice module is the remotely
removable attenuator, which is made from two stacked filters of absorptive Schott
glass with 27.8 dB and 30.8 dB attenuation respectively (58.6 dB in total). The
characterization of these filters was done by measuring their extinction with a 10mW
laser beam at 850nm and a power meter. While the exact brightness is controlled
electronically with the value of IB, this defined attenuation (together with further
losses within the Alice enclave) brings down the intensity of the laser diode pulses
to the single photon level for QKD operation. To avoid any angular deviation of
the QKD beam when the attenuator is inserted into the beam path, the filters were
especially selected for a vanishing wedge angle.
3.3.3 Pulse Intensity Calibration
The mean photon number per pulse sent by Alice is crucial to comply with the
protocol and consequentely for the security of the distributed key. The fraction
of multi photon pulses can only be estimated for a precise intensity of the pulses.
Therefore, the Alice module was equipped with a photo diode (PD) to allow for
calibration and measurement of this parameter in flight. Mounted on a remote
controlled servo arm, this PD can be brought into the beam path and the laser
power can be measured with the help of an ADC. For an increased dynamic range,
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Figure 3.15: Mean photon number µ of the Alice pulses after 67.1 dB
attenuation measured by focusing the Alice beam onto an APD when the
laser diodes are electronically adjusted to induce a certain response on the
calibration photo diode (PD). The straight line is a linear fit.
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the PD bias resistor can be selected in software. This allows to measure the power
of the bright cw beams, too.
The relationship between the mean photon number per pulse (after the attenu-
ator) and the response on the photodiode when placed in the beam (instead of the
attenuator) enables the calculation of the actual laser pulse brightness from the ADC
reading. This was measured beforehand in the lab using an APD to determine the
attenuated pulse intensity. In figure 3.15, the mean photon number per pulse µ is
plotted against the ADC value. µ is calculated for the total attenuation of 67.1 dB
between the Alice output and the exit from the glass dome. Additional losses to the
main attenuator are due to an extra attenuating filter (4.8 dB, could not be mounted
on the servo arm due to a lack of space there) and the FELT2 optics (3.7 dB). With
this information, the micro controller is able to perform a search for the bias current
value – the modulation current was kept maximal – resulting in pulses with a mean
intensity of exactly 0.5 photons.
Due to the high efficiency of the mode combination of the four diodes, small bias
currents were sufficient to produce the desired pulse intensities. As a consequence,
there was no background measurable between the pulses when the diodes were
switched off well below their laser threshold. This constitutes a big advantage
compared to prior experiments [87], where the large attenuation of the diode coupling
sometimes forced high bias currents close to the laser threshold. This resulted in a
much worse signal to noise ratio due to a non vanishing brightness in the “off” state.
3.3.4 Module Integration
To interface the QKD transmitter with the FELT2 optics, the coupling block (CB,
fig. 3.16) was chosen. There, the original setup provided two fiber ports to emit
beacon lasers with different divergences. They were both mounted to the back of
the CB pointing through two holes in the CB mirror. By passing the bright beams
(2W peak) through holes in the coupling mirror, possible stray light, which might
occur on the surfaces of a dicroic mirror and then disturb the tracking sensors, can
be avoided.
For classical communication experiments, only one of the two fiber ports was
used at a time. Thus, for this demonstration, it was possible to remove one of them
in order to make room for the QKD beam coupling. For this purpose, a D-shaped
mirror was mounted to the back of the CB providing a beam access from the top
(fig. 3.16). Additionally, the CB silver mirror was replaced with a dichroic mirror
transmitting light with a wavelength of λ = 850nm to allow for a beam diameter
beyond the 4mm hole. Consequently, for the remaining fiber port only one hole was
drilled in this new mirror. A disadvantage of this configuration is the off axis access
to the terminal optical system which, however, could not be avoided without major
modifications of the terminal.
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Figure 3.16: FELT2 Coupling block. a: Schematic view of the coupling
block where the incoming signal from the OGS is overlapped with the terminal
beacon and the QKD signal. b: Back view. While the original design
symmetrically uses two fiber ports (FP) with different divergences for the
beacon laser, in this experiment one was exchanged for a D-shaped mirror (M)
providing access for the QKD beam from the top (red arrow). c: Front view.
The dichroic mirror replacing the original silver mirror with two holes. The
QKD beam passes the dichroic coating in the dotted circle. It is at this
component where the maximum possible full diameter of 7.5mm of the QKD
beam in the FELT2 is defined. The cross marks the axis of the FELT2 optical
system.
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3.3.5 Airworthiness Certification
The FELT2 host system already implements the requirements for the airworthiness
certification, for instance shielding of laser radiation from the aircraft personnel and
passengers and a fire-retardant housing.
During the design and construction process of the Alice module as an add-on
to the FELT2, special considerations had to be taken to keep the flight terminal
certifiable as a whole. Specifically, the demand for a robust and trustworthy
mechanical setup to minimize the chance of parts breaking apart in turbulent
flight situations. Moreover, cables and other plastics used had to meet applicable
standards, to limit the emission of toxic gasses in case of fire.
Most challenging, however, were laser safety considerations regarding the QKD
beam. The beam diameter and minimal divergence had to be specified by a
measurement report as the basis for the calculation of the applicable safety distance.
For static applications, this is the “extended nominal ocular hazard distance”
(NOHDe). Within this distance, somebody using binoculars or a consumer grade
telescope might be at risk when looking into the laser source. The NOHDe for
the QKD transmitter, however, is much longer than the intended flight height due
to its narrow divergence. Yet, in this airborne scenario, a prolonged exposition to
the beam can be excluded because it is practically impossible to track an arbitrary
observer accidentally. Therefore, a maximum exposure time of 100ms could be
argued for this experiment and the safety distance could be reduced to 800m. Note
that the host system communication and beacon laser has a much higher maximum
power of 2W peak. Due to the longer wavelength of 1550nm and the much wider
divergence, however, eye safety is already reached in a distance of 376m even for
prolonged exposition.
As the requirements from the airworthiness certification are primarily binding
to the pilot, a switch had to be installed in the cockpit that cuts and clears power
to the terminal laser systems. The aircraft operating manual was supplemented
with the documentation of the new switch and instructions that oblige the pilot to
disable the laser systems when flying below 800m or in situations when other air
traffic comes closer than this distance.
3.4 The QKD Receiver – Bob
The analysis of the transmitted qubits takes place in the Bob module. It houses all
optics necessary to passively select a basis out of {|H〉, |V 〉} and {|+45〉, | −45〉} at
a beam splitter and subsequently measure the polarization of the incoming, ideally
single photon pulses using polarizing beam splitters and APDs in Geiger mode. This
module design has been used in experiments before [16, 88, 90] and an illustration
of the internal setup is depicted in figure 3.17.
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Figure 3.17: Illustration of the Bob module optical setup. The receiver
implements two polarization analyzers with a polarizing beam splitter (PBS)
and two silicon APDs each. At a first non polarizing beam splitter (BS), the
incoming qubit is either reflected to the analyzer orientated in the {|H〉, |V 〉}
basis, or transmitted. In this case, the polarization is rotated by a λ/2 wave
plate set at 22.5◦ before the light enters the second analyzer, resulting in a
measurement in the {| + 45〉, | − 45〉} basis. Peltier elements underneath the
APD mounting blocks are used to cool the diodes and thereby reduce dark
count events.
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The silicon APD detectors (PerkinElmer C30902S) are cooled with Peltier
elements to −20 ◦C. At this temperature they show a dark count rate of about
500 s−1 each. The efficiency was previously measured to be around 38% [85]. The
APDs are passively quenched with a 390 kΩ resistor, leading to a significant dead
time of about 0.5 µs after a detection event [89]. Due to the low count rate to be
expected in this experiment, however, this is tolerable.
The Bob module electronics consists of controllers that maintain the APD
temperature, adjustable high voltage supplies for the biasing of the APDs and the
pulse detection circuit. The latter implements a threshold trigger for each channel
and a subsequent pulse shaping, which extends the output pulse length to 20 ns.
An overview of the complete OGS optical setup is sketched in figure 3.6: After
passing the telescope, the beam is collimated and the fast piezo actuated mirror
compensates for small fluctuations in the mean arriving wavefront direction as
described in section 3.2. The classical signal is then transmitted at a dichroic mirror
while the QKD beam gets reflected, compressed by a factor of 2 and finally, after
polarization correction, focused onto the APDs in the Bob module with an f = 75mm
lens. All together, this defines a field of view for the Bob module of 83 µrad calculated
from the detector diameter of 500µm and the effective focal length of the telescope
system of 6m. At the location of the aircraft in a distance of 20 km this translates to
a diameter of 1.7m and efficiently reduces the stray light susceptibility of the QKD
system. An interference filter (see also § 4.3.2) mounted in front of the Bob module
further reduces the remaining background.
The coalignment of the Bob module optical axis to the main telescope axis was
done at a distance of 500m. On the rooftop of a nearby building, a calibration
target was installed, emitting both the 1550nm beacon and an 850nm test signal
from a common open fiber end. With the OGS tracking this target, the receiving
direction of the Bob module could be manually overlapped with the telescope axis
by adjusting the mirrors on the OGS breadboard.
3.5 Management of Polarization Rotations
in the Quantum Channel
One of the underlying principles of QKD security is, that a measurement on the
qubits provides only meaningful results when performed in the correct bases. This
means in reverse, that the receiver has to use the exact same reference frame
for his measurement as was used for preparation of the states. Contrary to
stationary systems, in a mobile or even airborne scenario as in this experiment,
this is not trivially accomplished: The polarizations may appear rotated at Bob’s
due to the relative orientation of the aircraft and the ground station telescopes.
Moreover, phase shifts, which are introduced polarization dependently by the optical
components of the pointing systems, give rise to circular components, too. Therefore,
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to enable a low noise polarization encoded quantum transmission, it is crucial to
compensate these effects somewhere in the quantum channel using for example a set
of wave plates. However, as the aircraft changes its orientation relative to the OGS
permanently, new angular positions for these wave plates have to be determined for
a successful compensation – ideally continuously.
The first approach to realize a polarization compensation scheme was to measure
the actual polarization rotation of the quantum channel at the receiver with the help
of a bright (≈ 1mW) calibration signal from the transmitter. This can be achieved
by once in a while sending the two non orthogonal states |H〉 and |45〉 for a short
time each and measure the polarizations actually arriving at the Bob module. The
necessary calibration intervals depend on the trajectory of the airplane. On the
projected circular path, however, no fast changes are to be expected. The exact
time before a recalibration needs to be determined in flight.
For this scheme, a compact polarimeter3, offering a dynamic range from−60 dBm
to 10 dBm, was mounted on the ground station. A remote controlled flip mirror was
installed to direct the received signal onto this polarimeter on demand. The phase
shifts introduced by the flip mirror and one additional mirror were measured once
to enable the calculation of the polarization as it enters the Bob module.
This strategy would in principle enable a complete characterization of the
birefringence of the quantum channel and thereby allow to calculate angular
positions for the wave plates to compensate for all polarization rotations. In the
ground to ground tests, however, it was difficult to obtain reliable measurements
from the polarimeter within integration times of 1 s to 3 s. While the high dynamic
range of the device was perfect for this scenario, the measurement principle proved
to be not suited in the presence of fluctuations (see § 4.1). Therefore, a closed loop
control could not be realized.
The alternative option therefore was an open loop control of the polarization
compensation depending on a careful characterization of the relevant system
components. Especially in view of finite key effects (see § 5.3.2), an advantage of
this approach is, that there is no need for calibration intervals and the quantum
transmission does not have to be interrupted.
The overall polarization rotation in the quantum channel can be decomposed
into the following effects:
i. static birefringence within the flight terminal
ii. phase shifts introduced at the moving pointing mirrors of the flight terminal
due to the varying angle of incidence
iii. phase shifts introduced passing the optical dome, possibly depending on the
position on the dome (i.e. the pointing direction)
3model: Thorlabs PAN5710IR1
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iv. spatial rotation of the aircraft around the beam axis.
v. static birefringence of the OGS optics. (Note that the spatial orientation of the
OGS telescope is not relevant here as it moves as a whole.)
All these distortions to the polarization can either be measured beforehand, if
necessary depending on the pointing direction of the flight terminal, or calculated
from live data in flight. This shall be explained in more detail in the following.
3.5.1 Polarization Rotations in the
Flight Terminal (i to iii)
In the flight terminal, the QKD beam is reflected by several fixed mirrors and passes
a dicroic mirror as well as two lenses which are coated for telecom wavelengths.
All these components can cause static polarization rotations. The mirrors in
the pointing system, however, introduce effective phase shifts depending on their
orientation, i.e., depending on the terminal pointing direction. The glass dome may
introduce distortions depending on the position the beam passes, too. Therefore,
the combined effect on the polarization of the FELT2 terminal optics including the
glass dome was measured for all relevant pointing directions in the lab. This was
done using the polarimeter mentioned above to determine the birefringent effects on
the two polarizations |H〉 and |45〉 sent by Alice.
The result (fig. 3.18) was used to model the polarization effects within the
FELT2 depending on the pointing elevation (ϑ) and azimuth (ϕ) as a rotation
RFELT(ϑ, ϕ). As it turns out, the terminal dome does not seem to introduce any
severe birefringence – at least without any air stream4. Additionally, the phase
shifts introduced by the pointing mirrors cancel out. Therefore, only the geometric
rotation of the field of view with the azimuth angle, a feature of the coudé beam
path, remains and a simple linear model suffices.
To additionally provide information about the current direction of the FELT2
pointing mirrors to the compensation algorithm working at the OGS, the data
protocol for transmitting the aircraft GPS and heading data via the UHF radio
link was extended for the two pointing angles ϑ and ϕ. With a repetition frequency
of 5Hz, this data enables a nearly instant calculation of new angular positions for
the wave plates.
3.5.2 Spatial Polarization Rotations (iv)
The only entirely spatial rotation of the qubit polarization that remains to be
compensated is the rotation of the aircraft around the beam axis (iv). For distances
4The gradient of the air stream velocity is known to cause some birefringence. The effect is,
however, supposed to be very small [91]
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Figure 3.18: Polarization measurement for Alice states |H〉 and |45〉 after
the FELT2 glass dome for relevant pointing directions of the flight terminal.
The resulting polarizations are characterized by their azimuth and elevation
on the Poincaré sphere. Due to the limited flight altitude to be expected, the
circular path of the aircraft and the distance to the OGS only small negative
pointing elevation angles are relevant. The gray lines indicate the modeled
behavior.
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much greater than the flight altitude and on the projected circular path around
the OGS, the beam axis almost coincides with the aircraft pitch axis, the transverse
horizontal axis. As a consequence, most of the time the pitch angle – the rotation
around this axis – is small owing to the fact that the airplane does not follow steep
trajectories. Because in this experiment there is also not much variation of this
angle, the actual pitch value δ was reported by the pilot and manually entered in
the control algorithm as a linear rotation Rspatial(δ) of the polarization reference
frame.
3.5.3 Polarization Rotations OGS (v)
Because the OGS telescope with all subsequent optics is moved as a whole to change
the pointing, its orientation relative to the arriving photons is unchanged and only
static polarization effects have to be considered at Bob’s. In order to measure them,
the OGS tracking was locked on a dummy laser source on a rooftop at a distance
of 500 m. The Bob module was exchanged for the polarimeter and a polarizer
was placed in the beam right behind the main mirror. The overall birefringence of
all components up to the Bob module was then measured with horizontal and 45◦
settings of this polarizer, which allows to calculate the static rotation ROGS of the
polarization reference frame at the OGS.
3.5.4 Compensation Model and Polarization Controller
In summary, all distortions listed in 3.5 are now characterized and either invariant
or parametrized by angles accessible during the flight experiment. The overall
polarization distortion can thus be calculated as
R(ϑ, ϕ, δ) = ROGS Rspatial(δ)RFELT(ϑ, ϕ) (3.2)
For compensation, first two quarter wave plates followed by a half wave plate are
used. Angular positions for these elements are calculated from the rotation R(ϑ, ϕ, δ)
every 200ms and sent to the free-space polarization controller (fig. 3.20) mounted
on the OGS breadboard right in front of the Bob module (fig. 3.6). The strategy for
calculation of the wave plates’ angular positions (illustrated in fig. 3.19) first rotates
the great circle containing the Alice polarizations in a way that makes it cut the poles
of the Poincaré sphere. This can always be accomplished deterministically with a
quarter wave plate orientated perpendicular to the intersection of this great circle
with the equatorial plane and is easily calculated as a set of cross products. The
intersection of the rotated circle with the equatorial plane defines the orientation of
the second quarter wave plate, resulting in all four Alice polarizations rotated back
to the equator of the Poincaré sphere. The final half wave plate then brings them
back to their initial positions. Extra care has to be taken in order not to alter the
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Figure 3.19: Illustration of the strategy to compensate an arbitrary rotation
of the Alice states |V 〉, |45〉, |H〉, | − 45〉, resulting in the polarizations a,
b, c, d on the Poincaré sphere. (i) A first quarter wave plate is oriented
perpendicular to the intersection of the equator and the great circle (red)
described by the received polarizations. (ii): The circle now intersects the
poles of the Poincaré sphere and a second quarter wave plate is orientated
along the circle’s intersection with the equator. (iii): All polarizations a-d are
now linear and a final half wave plate is adjusted to make up for the rotation
within the equator and arrive in the compensated situation depicted in (iv).
Note that following this strategy, the angular positions of the wave plates are
only defined modulo pi and it has to be ensured by the correct orientation of
the last half wave plate that the cyclic sequence of the four polarizations is not
destroyed.
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sequence (|H〉 → |45〉 → |V 〉 → |−45〉) of polarizations around the Poincaré sphere
by the correct orientation of the final half wave plate (see fig. 3.19).
3.6 Timestamping Electronics
All detector events from the Bob module are timestamped and saved to allow for
later analysis of the received signal. The analysis is facilitated, if both Alice and
Bob already operate synchronously. For this purpose, the Alice clock is distributed
over the classical optical channel by modulating the flight terminal data and beacon
laser. At the OGS, this signal is fed into a phase-locked loop (PLL) and finally used
as a clock for the FPGA to timestamp the signals. Running at 200MHz, the FPGA
assigns the number of cycles since start as a coarse timestamp (48 bit) to every
event. This allows for over 390h of operation without overflow. A carry chain is
used to interpolate these 5 ns intervals to get a fine granular timestamp with a bin
size of ≈ 56 ps, a technique explained for example in [92]. The resulting integers,
together with the detector number are packed in a 64 bit value and transmitted via
USB to a computer.
3.7 Software Experiment Control and Online Eval-
uation
A number of software modules were created to control the hardware components
involved in this experiment. Moreover, for online evaluation of the QKD transmis-
sion, a complex suite was developed, which is able to perform a local QKD sifting
process with the help of the known PRBS sequence and allows to log and visualize
all transmission parameters in real time.
3.7.1 Alice Control
The software to control the Alice module entirely runs on the embedded micro
controller. A serial terminal on a laptop is used to communicate with the module
over a USB connection. The available commands comprise:
• Functions to measure temperature, supply voltages and maximum available
laser power (coupling of the mode filter) and to report the operating status.
• Selection and activation of different slow and bright blink patterns useful for
signal acquisition and alignment.
• Control of the motorized arm to place the photodiode or the attenuator in the
beam.
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Figure 3.20: Three-fold motorized rotation mounts for free-space polarization
transformations. The design is trimmed for a small footprint and little weight
as it is moving with the OGS telescope. Still, the ability to accommodate
common 1 in optics (here wave plates) was preserved. Reference switches (hall
sensors with neodym magnets in the rotating wheels) enable calibration for
absolute positions after a power cycle. The unit is controlled via a USB
connection.
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• Setting of the laser diode bias and modulation currents. Additionally, the bias
current control can be bypassed and set to the maximum operating current
for the laser diodes in order to produce a bright cw beam.
• Measurement and calibration of the QKD pulse brightnesses.
• Polarization pattern and PRBS length selection.
The real time clock built into the module provides accurate human readable timing
information, which is displayed with all commands and messages from the module.
This allows to use the logfile of the serial terminal in the experiment evaluation.
3.7.2 Online Filtering and Sifting
The main online evaluation tool is a software that reads in the data from the
timestamping FPGA, logs it and determines basic parameters like count rates.
Additionally it executes the sifting. This process is facilitated as Alice and Bob
both know the PRBS used to prepare the qubits and therefore, no additional classical
communication is needed. Note, however, that for a secure exchange of a truly
random key, a classical channel between Alice and Bob is needed which has to be
authenticated properly.
Synchronization and Filtering:
The first task is to synchronize receiver and transmitter. This is facilitated by
the Alice clock being transmitted as a 100MHz signal via the classical link to
Bob. Therefore, the timestamping on the ground already works synchronously.
Because the QKD-pulse repetition frequency is only 10MHz, Bob has to divide
the transmitted clock accordingly. A time histogram of the received events then
allows him to determine the phase/delay of the qubits arrival within the resulting
100ns intervals. This delay is composed of an integer multiple of 10 ns due to the
frequency division with arbitrary remainder and an overall fixed delay. The latter is
accumulated from the time needed for pulse processing at Alice and Bob relative to
the delays in the clock distribution via the classical channel and the clock recovery
for the Bob timestamping unit. Note that the time of flight of the photons, namely
the distance from the airplane to the ground station, is irrelevant, as the clock is
transmitted via the same channel as the quantum signal. Once synchronized, an
online coarse time filtering of the recorded events eliminates the majority of clicks
from dark counts or stray light and assigns the filtered events to transmitter time
slots.
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Sifting
As a next step, the sifting can be performed: While this usually involves
communication between Alice and Bob, due to the unidirectional classical link, this
process is done locally in this demonstration on the basis of the commonly known
PRBS. By a cross correlation of the PRBS with the received signal for multiple delays
of 100ns, the polarization pattern phase is determined and Bob discards the events
measured in the wrong basis to obtain the sifted key. At this stage, the QBER can
be calculated. While privacy amplification, necessary to actually distill a secure key,
is not performed online, estimates for the main parameters allowing to judge the
QKD performance – attenuation and QBER – are immediately available during the
experiment.
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Chapter 4
Field Tests and Flight Campaign
While the actual flight tests are the main subject and the highlight of this work, the
preparations in the preceding months were equally important. Besides the design,
the assembly and the integration of the QKD hardware as described in the last
chapter, characterization and extensive testing of the combined system was done in
ground to ground tests to lay the best possible foundations for a successful flight
experiment. In fact, the strategies for compensation of the polarization rotations
and the need for the fine calibration of the QKD pointing in flight emerged from
these tests. Starting from the moment the whole system was ready to leave the lab,
this chapter shall describe the last steps to and including the experimental flights.
4.1 Ground to Ground Testing
In the ground to ground tests preceding the experimental flights, tests on different
distances were performed to primarily evaluate the performance of the bidirectional
pointing and the coalignment of the QKD beam with the tracking axis between the
terminal and the OGS. Further tests also concerned the QKD beam collimation, the
polarization compensation and the clock synchronization from Alice to Bob.
These field trials were performed using a test vehicle already equipped with
a power generator and the antennas (GPS, UHF) needed for the FELT2. The flight
terminal was mounted on a lab trolley and secured in the vehicle with the door open.
Beyond static tests, this also allowed trials at moderate speed of the FELT2. Up to
30 km/h could be achieved for several seconds, which corresponds to an angular
speed of up to 3mrad/s and is comparable to the conditions during flight.
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the test links. In distances of da = 330m,
db = 2.5 km and dc = 4.6 km around the OGS in Gilching 23 km west of Munich,
Germany, locations were found providing a direct line of sight to the OGS telescope.
Dynamic tests, however, were only possible on db.
The first issue that emerged in the field trials concerned the polarization
compensation scheme and led to the strategy as detailed in section 3.5.4. Even
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Gilching
orthophoto: Bayer. Vermessungsverwaltung
Figure 4.1: Location of the ground to ground test distances used to evaluate
the correct operation of the system . The short link da was also used to line
up the Alice pointing relative to the tracking axis before every flight. On db,
the pointing and tracking could also be tried dynamically with the test vehicle
accelerating on about 100m. The inset shows the FELT2 mounted on the lab
trolley in the car.
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though prior lab tests with simulated fluctuations were positive, it turned out that
the polarimeter was not able to provide reliable measurements of the polarizations
received over the free-space link within an acceptable time. This was attributed to
the work principle of the device [93]: Using only one photodiode, the polarimeter
measures the polarization with the help of a rotating quarter wave plate and a fixed
polarizer. The resulting signal is a combination of two sine curves and is evaluated
for their relative phases and amplitudes to obtain the polarization orientation.
While this measurement technique could in principle offer some robustness against
asynchronous fluctuations, this was not the case and even with long measurement
times (i.e., many revolutions of the wave plate) the acquired precision on the
polarization angles was worse than ±5◦ what finally made a quasi closed loop scheme
impossible.
While all other classical and quantum subsystems could be enabled without
major obstacles, the calibration of the crucial QKD beam coalignment with the
classical pointing axis (see also section 3.2.2) turned out to be sensitive to even the
slightest deformation of the FELT2 breadboard.
4.2 Calibration of Coalignment and Beam Diver-
gence
Preset in the lab on a distance of 50m, the QKD pointing could be adjusted on
the field test distances for optimal overlap with the pointing axis while the tracking
system was in operation. The custom optical breadbord of the FELT2, however,
turned out not to be stiff enough to maintain the alignment reliable over time
scales beyond a day: The slightest stress on the FELT2 setup manifested itself by a
deviation of the crypto beam causing a nearly complete loss of signal. While the
shock mounts mediate or damp most of the forces that potentially change the shape
of the breadboard, deviations of the QKD pointing relative to the classical system
were especially evident when tying together the cables connecting the terminal to
the laptops, antennas and power supplies. While this could be avoided, there was
still the possibility that the coalignment would get lost in flight due to single shocks
or temperature expansion of individual components.
To provide the best possible coalignment in the beginning of each experiment, it
was readjusted right before every flight. For this procedure, the short test distance
da to the airfield was used, where the aircraft could be placed in a direct line of sight
to the OGS. There, a target (fig. 4.2) was placed with a beacon laser emitting from
an open fiber end in its center. The FELT2 could track this target and the position
of the QKD beam was visualized using an infrared capable linear camera. The image
was sent via wireless LAN back to the aircraft in real time, where it enabled an
adjustment of the Alice pointing for best possible overlap with the tracking axis.
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While this procedure ensures an optimal setting right before the aircraft engines
start, there is no guarantee that it is maintained until the QKD transmission actually
takes place. Therefore, a scheme for in flight fine calibration was developed.
4.2.1 Scheme for Online Pointing Error Compensation
To compensate systematic Alice pointing errors, which might arise during taxiing,
takeoff and due to varying temperatures in the terminal, a possibility to fine adjust
the QKD beam pointing in flight had to be developed.
The solution makes use of the wide divergence of the FELT2 laser (3mrad)
compared to the QKD beam with a divergence of 182µrad only: In the FELT2 FPA
control loop, normally the DSP aims to keep the incoming light on the center of the
quadrant diode controlling the voice coil mirror accordingly (explained in fig. 3.5).
Here, the DSP firmware was altered to accept an offset vector c = (cx, cv), which was
subtracted from the error signal1: Rather than on the center (0, 0) of the quadrant
diode, the control loop aims to keep the focused OGS beacon at c. This results
in an intentional error of the FELT2 receiver orientation, which, however, is not
critical due to the wide field of view of the FELT2 fine tracking system (3.3mrad).
The accompanying small misspointing of the terminal beacon does not harm the
operation of the classical system, either: Due to its wide divergence, enough light
can still be caught by the OGS tracking and data communication sensors.
In this way, the fine control of the QKD pointing could be enabled in software
and no changes to the already certified terminal hardware were necessary.
4.2.2 Measurement of QKD Beam Divergence
The divergence of the beam was set and measured here by reducing the beam
diameter as much as possible moving the collimation lens in front of the pinhole
(fig. 3.9). Of course, this strategy does not converge exactly to the minimum
divergence possible because the theoretically smallest beam diameter in the distance
of da = 300m occurs for an intermediate waist near to the terminal. As this waist,
is only slightly smaller than the telescope aperture, the divergence is only a few µrad
wider compared to the optimal case (see section 3.3.2). In the experiment, however,
much wider beams were observed on the target than theoretically predicted. This
is because the beam, as prepared by Alice, is not perfectly gaussian and the FELT2
terminal optics is entered only parallel to the axis. Hence, it is not clear, to which
extent gaussian beam propagation is applicable. To get an estimate for the actual
divergence of the QKD beam, the 1/e2 level was visualized on the camera image 4.2(b)
1These coordinates do not represent linear distances on the quadrant diode but rather voltage
differences between its top and bottom (left and right respectively) halves. The resulting beam
displacement is not linear and strongly depends on the focus shape. Therefore, there is no reliable
relation between the actual angular variation and the values of c.
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Figure 4.2: Calibration of the Alice alignment relative to the tracking axis.
a: In the center of the target, an open fiber end emits a beacon the FELT2 can
track on. Once the tracking is locked, the infrared capable camera makes the
Alice beam visible on the target. b: From the linear camera image, one can
deduce the 1/e2 ≈ 13.5% boundary of the Alice beam marked here in red with
the help of the color bar. The distance of the target rings is ∆r = 20mm. By
adjusting the coupling mirrors of the Alice, the QKD beam could be centered
on the target to establish the coalignment.
and the diameter d(330 m) ≈ 60mm could be measured with the help of the target
rings. From this, the divergence angle of the QKD beam is derived geometrically to
be 182µrad which corresponds to the divergence of a Gaussian beam with diameter
6mm at the 1/e2 level. The beam diameter in a distance of 20 km, i.e., at the OGS
is 3.6m.
Under good seeing conditions, the Fried parameter can be well above r0 = 10 cm
which would allow a telescope with aperture d > r0 to reach an angular resolution of
8.5 µrad. This shows, that the collimation of the beam in the current configuration
is indeed limited by the effective telescope aperture and not by the turbulence in
the atmosphere. Thus, significant improvements are possible with larger telescopes.
4.3 Experimental Flights
As the experiments had to be performed in the dark to reduce the noise due to stray
light, the flight campaign had to take place in winter in order to leave enough time
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between sunset around 18:00 and the closing of the special airport Oberpfaffenhofen
at 21:00. Furthermore, the dates were chosen to be around new moon to avoid this
source of background stray light, too.
At first, the flights were planned in the beginning of November 2010. Due to
delays in the airworthiness certification process, however, these dates had to be
abandoned and the experimental flight campaign was finally scheduled in the week
from February 28 to March 4 2011 (new moon on March 4).
While the first day was reserved for the system integration into the aircraft
and the final certification, four flights were planned on the remaining days. Due
to insufficient weather conditions, some starts had to be canceled as for aircraft
operation according to the visual flight rules (VFR) a certain minimum visual range
and distance from clouds has to be maintained. Fortunately, the opportunity of
additional flights in the following week opened up. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.3 give
an overview of the campaign with the three flights actually carried out and a brief
description of the results.
4.3.1 Atmospheric conditions
During the final flight at which the QKD demonstration analyzed in chapter 5 was
performed, it was slightly hazy. There was a closed cloud cover restricting the flight
altitude to ≈ 1100m above ground. Direct light from the first quarter moon (located
in the west, elevation 30.8◦ at 19:55) thus was shaded. A diffuse illumination,
however, was produced by the clouds which also reflected the Munich and suburban
lights.
4.3.2 Spectral Filtering
To suppress background light, an interference filter was used. However, as neither
this filter nor the Alice laser diodes were temperature controlled, filters with different
central wavelengths were tried in the experiment to maximize signal coupling.
During the key transmission analyzed here, the ambient temperature at the OGS
was 7.6 ◦C and the temperature of the laser diodes was 44.1 ◦C to 44.8 ◦C (fig. 4.5).
This led to an increase in the emitted wavelengths and a shift to the blue of the
interference filter. Under these conditions, a filter with a nominal central wavelength
of 860nm and a width of 10 nm (full-width at half-maximum (FWHM)) was found to
provide the best results (see § 3.4). The rather wide spectral width of this filter was
chosen to account for temperature fluctuations and the resulting relative variations
between the filter and the laser diodes.
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Figure 4.3: Flight tracks for all three flights. a: First flight performed on
March 2. The pointing and tracking on circular, radial and tangential paths
was tested and had still to be optimized. The correction of the fine pointing as
explained in section 4.2.1 was tested. The most stable results could be obtained
on the circular paths which were, thus, used exclusively on the following days.
b: Second flight, March 3. Slowly modulated bright light and also pulses with
a mean intensity of 50 photons could successfully be registered at the ground
station. Further experience with the fine pointing compensation was gained.
c: Third flight, March 9. On the first two passages (note the two turning loops)
the pointing was optimized. It emerged, that the compensation values were
different and the results for the clockwise track were better. Thus all following
passages were performed clockwise. On the way back along the diameter, the
plane went at a higher speed, therefore it only took about 6min. This time was
used for recalibration of the Alice pulse intensities. On the third passage a QKD
transmission with mean intensity of 1 photon per pulse was achieved for 12min
which showed a mean error rate of 4% at a mean sifted key rate of 450 bit/s.
On the fourth passage, the data analyzed in chapter 5 was obtained with a
mean pulse intensity of 0.5photons per pulse. After three further passages
which were used to optimize the telescope coupling, a cable of the telemetry
antenna at the OGS broke and no further experiments could be performed.
Especially the tracks with smaller radius (18 km) could not be tested as the
repair on the ground took too long.
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Table 4.1: Overview of the flight campaign schedule with brief results.
date results
Mo 28.2.2011 mounting of terminal into
aircraft
final certification
Di 1.3.2011 flight canceled
(bad weather conditions)
Mi 2.3.2011 first flight tracking and pointing
optimization
Do 3.3.2011 second flight bright cw and pulsed
tests (50 photons/pulse)
Fr 4.3.2011 flight canceled
(technical problems OGS†)
Mo 7.3.2011 flight canceled
(technical problems sat phone‡)
Di 8.3.2011 flight canceled
(bad weather conditions)
Mi 9.3.2011 third flight QKD operation
(0.5 photons/pulse)
†Due to the failure of a PCI real time clock in one of the OGS computers, the controlling LabVIEW software
refused to work. The issue could not be resolved in time.
‡ For this day, only a newer version of the satellite phone was available. Unfortunately it was not compatible
with the external antenna mounted on the aircraft. This issue was discovered to late and as a consequence, the
experiment coordination would not have been possible in flight.
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Figure 4.4: Flight track followed during the key exchange. Due to airspace
regulations concerning the Munich airport, the plane could not go far north
of the OGS. Therefore, the experiment was performed on half circles around
the OGS. The red line marks the duration of 604 s of the actual key exchange
analyzed in chapter 5.
4.3.3 Flight Track
For the first experiment, a circular flight track around the OGS was planned, as the
relative position between the aircraft and the OGS does not change much in this
scenario. Only small fluctuations due to turbulences and a slight variation from
the tangential orientation due to wind are to be expected. Therefore, the circular
track promises to be most friendly concerning pointing optimization as planned in
section 4.2.1 and also eliminated the need for a refocusing of the OGS telescope.
Moreover, a manual compensation of the polarizations could have worked in case
the automatic system described in section 3.5 had failed. Other tracks had been
projected (tangential, radial) and approved by the air traffic control. There were,
however, no QKD experiments performed on these tracks due to a lack of time.
The aircraft was not allowed to go far north of the OGS, as there already begins
the airspace controlled by the Munich airport. Hence, the actual track was the
southern half circle illustrated in figure 4.4. Moreover, slight variations of the
coalignment with the telescope pointing to the right or to the left of the aircraft
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made it favorable to only fine adjust for one direction and taking the short way back
along the west-east diameter.
For the track radius, a compromise had to be found: At a distance of 20 km, the
minimum possible aircraft speed of around 290 km/h translates to an angular speed
of 4.0mrad/s. While a smaller distance in principle promises increased coupling
for the QKD beam, higher angular speeds would have degraded the OGS pointing
accuracy due to the telescope mount starting to vibrate. The flight height was
1100m above ground governed by the meteorological conditions, as the VFR demand
a certain vertical distance to the cloud cover.
With the given parameters, one passage along the half circle takes about 13min
and the way back to the start about 8.5min. On the narrow curved path in the
beginning and the end of the circular track, the aircraft roll angle (longitudinal
axis) can get large. As the elevation angle of the CPA is limited to about 5◦ above
its horizon, there are regions where no link is possible. Furthermore, considering
a short time for link acquisition, the usable experiment time per passage is about
10 to 12min.
4.3.4 In Flight Pointing Optimization
Once the aircraft reached its final height and the telescope link was established
successfully, the first task in flight was a fine adjustment of the QKD pointing to
eliminate any residual alignment errors. As described in section 4.2.1, a pointing
control offset vector c was searched, optimizing the Alice-Bob coupling. For this
purpose, the Alice attenuator was swung out and a slowly modulated periodic
pattern was sent with all four laser diodes at full power (2 s on – 0.5 s off). This
produced a distinctive response at the receiver that also allowed to distinguish
background and signal contribution. The OGS operators announced the receiver
count rates over satellite phone back to the aircraft, where the offset vector c was
recursively modified and optimized. After some experience from the second flight,
on the third flight this process could be completed during the first two passages.
4.3.5 Key Exchange
Immediately prior to the key exchange, the Alice pulse intensities were calibrated to
µ = 0.5 photons/pulse. Table 4.2 shows the measurements of µ after this calibration
and directly after the key exchange. The table reveals a slight decrease of the
pulse intensities during the experiment of 2% to 4%. The reason is most likely the
temperature change of 0.8◦C in the relevant time interval (see fig. 4.5).
The Alice QKD transmitter was enabled right at the beginning of the passage
and the key exchange began as soon as a stable link was established. The tracking
was lost 604 s later and the key exchange thereby terminated. Unfortunately, soon
after this transmission, a cable feeding the OGS telemetry antenna broke and could
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Table 4.2: Mean photon number per pulse measured for the four Alice
laser diodes directly before and after the key transmission with the integrated
photodiode.
time polarization state
| + 45〉 |V 〉 | − 45〉 |V 〉 mean
(hh:mm:ss) (photons/pulse)
19:48:36 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49
19:59:18 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.48
not be fixed in the remaining time before the airplane had to land (≈ 20:45). This
is why further tests – projected with a longer PRBS as described in section 3.3.1 –
could not be performed anymore.
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Figure 4.5: Temperature of the Alice framework close to the laser diode
mounts for the duration of the experiment. During the key exchange (area
shaded green) there was a temperature increase of 0.8◦C.
Chapter 5
Results and Analysis
This chapter is dedicated to the post processing and analysis of the data generated in
the flight experiments. While there was an online synchronization and sifting done,
this was primarily intended to provide fast feedback about the QKD performance
and estimates for the transmission parameters. Here, a more detailed and adapted
analysis will be described allowing for optimization of the filtering in order to
maximize the final key rate [40].
In this experiment, however, technological simplifications were adopted. While
the solutions are in principle practicable and have already been shown, the main
focus here was to enable the demonstration with only about one year of preparation
and in the limited time, the aircraft was available for experiments. Therefore,
the secure key rate achievable in this experiment has to be calculated based on
assumptions, which are detailed here.
For evaluation of the quantum transmission, the raw data files as produced
by the Bob timestamping unit were used. Using custom software written in C,
the relevant intervals were extracted, count rates evaluated, filter applied, and
finally, all quantities relevant for the QKD post processing were determined. Further
calculations and optimizations were done in Mathematica.
5.1 Raw Event Rates and Signal Recovery
During the demonstration, the receiver detectors experienced a significant back-
ground event rate of r0 ≈ 3500 s−1 all together when pointing into the night sky.
Roughly half of this background was caused by stray light, the other half was due
to detector dark counts. When the tracking is locked on the aircraft terminal, an
additional background source becomes visible: The anti-collision beacon flash tubes
located on top and underneath the aircraft fuselage. These red lights produce short
(1ms to 3ms) bright flashes with a frequency of 0.5Hz to 1Hz and may not be
turned off during flight. Their pattern is clearly visible in Bob’s raw count rate
(fig. 5.1). The red and green navigation lights at the wingtips, however, do not
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Figure 5.1: Raw detector count rate for a representative interval of 30 s. The
signal is dominated by the anti collision flashes which appear as short spikes
of 1ms to 3ms length. The inset displays the location of the two flash tubes
(red stars), which can be distinguished due to their amplitude and their slightly
different frequencies. The brighter one is located near the optical dome (yellow
arrow) underneath the aircraft, the other is located on the back of the fuselage.
contribute significantly to the dark count rate. The cabin lighting was disabled
as far as possible to avoid additional noise from light shining through the aircraft
windows.
Before any further analysis, the raw signals are filtered to remove the anti collision
flashes. This is done by a simple threshold filter, which discards intervals of 10ms in
case the count rate is higher than on average. However, with the frequencies of the
flashes being about 0.69Hz and 0.85Hz, 1.5% of the transmission time is discarded.
5.1.1 Transmitter – Receiver Synchronization
In order to perform a signal recovery and subsequently the sifting, a transcription of
the events registered in units of real time has to be performed to associate measured
signals to time slot numbers shared between Alice and Bob. Yet, as the Alice clock
is transmitted via the classical optical link as a 100MHz signal, the whole system
is operated in principle synchronously. Only the phase of the 10MHz repetition
5.1. RAW EVENT RATES AND SIGNAL RECOVERY 65
frequency remains to be determined. As described in section 3.7.2, this phase can
be retrieved from a time histogram of the registered events to fully synchronize the
system.
The remaining task is to find the start condition in the data stream. While
this is typically accomplished by the introduction of synchronization headers in the
sent stream [88], here the cyclic nature of the transmitted signal allows to find the
sequence start by a cross correlation of the time filtered string with the original
PRBS (see also § 3.3.1).
5.1.2 Diode Delay Compensation
As mentioned already in section 3.3.1, the originally projected emitter coupled logic
(ECL) delay ICs could not be assembled on the main electronics board in the Alice
module due to their significant heat dissipation. This results in an individual delay
between the diode emission times and the 10MHz beat (see fig. 3.8), which has to
be taken into account when time filtering the receiver events. As in this experiment,
the four polarizations were sent sequentially, this is straight forward: A histogram
of the events over their arrival times modulo 400ns (i.e. four time slots) reveals the
mean time shifts for each diode and time filtering is done around these positions.
In this way, the compensation of the delays is applied on the transmitted pulses
and does not influence the QBER. Significant individual delays of the four receiver
channels are not considered here as no such evidence could be found in the time
histograms of the received signals.
5.1.3 Temporal Signal Statistics and Filtering
The received clicks, even though synchronized, show an accumulated time jitter on
their timestamps. This is due to a combination of the jitter in the clock interface
from the Alice module to the FELT2, the optical transmission, the interfacing and
clock recovery at the ground station, and of course the APD detection of the signal
in the Bob module. Figure 5.2 shows a histogram of the detection times relative
to the Bob clock. The width of 1.2 ns (FWHM) can be directly compared to the
width of the transmitter pulses as documented in section 3.3.1 (fig. 3.8) as the same
APD jitter is included in both measurements. Again assuming Gaussian statistics, a
deconvolution determines the time jitter of the clock synchronization system alone
to 0.66 ns.
Once the synchronization is established, time filtering can suppress background
events significantly: Accepting only events from the Bob module within a time
window of width τf around the expected time of arrival in the f = 10MHz beat,
the fraction of all registered background and dark counts which actually enter the
raw key data is reduced to τff . While, evidently from figure 5.2, the signal to
noise ratio (SNR) is best for narrow time filtering. However, the more restrictive the
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Figure 5.2: Time histogram of the Bob detections relative to the expected
arrival times. The green region visualizes the time filtering with an acceptance
window full width of 0.5 ns. Events in the red region are discarded in the time
filtering. Timestamps are corrected for delays of individual diodes due to the
Alice pulse generation. The inset shows the QBER and the secure key rate to
be expected after privacy amplification over the time gate width (detailed in
§ 5.3.2).
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applied filtering is, the more signal counts are discarded, too. As a consequence,
one has a trade-off between raw key rate or length and the amount of noise, which
is here observed as QBER. The final figure of merit is of course the secure key
rate distillable from the raw data in privacy amplification. The situation for this
experiment – forestalled the analysis in section 5.3.2 – is depicted in figure 5.2:
A time window of 0.5 ns maximizes the final secure key rate. The signal loss due
to this restrictive filtering is 4.2 dB, however, it yields a QBER of 4.77% as the
background probability in these short time windows is only r0τf = 1.75× 10−6 with
the background event rate r0.
Subsequently to the time filtering, a second filter is applied in software to
eliminate intervals with poor signal to noise ratio: For every second, the registered
timestamps are histogrammed modulo 100ns similar to figure 5.2. If the contrast
between the maximum of the histogram (for increased stability averaged over several
histogram bins) and the noise background drops below an empirically determined
threshold, the data of this second is discarded. This eliminates transmission intervals
suffering from short signal faints or high background, which would otherwise
contribute sifted key with a QBER of approximately 50%. The usable transmission
time is reduced by this filter by 29 nonconsecutive seconds to T = 575 s. Starting
from an overall transmission duration of 604 s, this corresponds to a factor of 0.95.
However, it has to be stressed that this is no post selection of intervals with low
QBER, as the filter is applied before the sifting. Otherwise, an eavesdropper might
be able to have Bob discard individual intervals by selectively introducing noise and
construct an attack thereof.
5.2 Transmission Parameters
5.2.1 Channel Attenuation
An intuitive estimate for the channel attenuation η can be formulated as the fraction
of detection events after time filtering Nt over the number of sent pulses T × f and
the mean photon number per pulse µ:
η ≈ Nt
Tfµ
(5.1)
Here, η shall comprise all attenuation from outside the Alice enclave to the received
signals accepted after filtering. The above estimate, however, disregards the
threshold behavior of the single photon detectors, which leads to a different channel
transmittance ηi for every i-photon state [94]:
ηi = 1− (1− η)i (5.2)
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Table 5.1: Terminology: yield (Y ) and gain (Q) values.
Symbol Quantity Description
Yi yield the probability to register a sent pulse that initially
contained i-photons.
The Yi describe the quantum channel, their values,
however, might be arbitrarily modified by an
adversary.
Qi gain the yield times the probability that Alice actually
sends an i-photon pulse
Qµ gain probability to register an event due to a pulse sent
with mean intensity µ (sum over Qi, see eq. (5.4)).
This expresses the probability that at least one of i photons in the original pulse
triggers a detector click. It is thus necessary to investigate the calculation of the
channel attenuation in more detail1.
Starting point is the so called Yield Yi, the probability to obtain a detection event
from an i-photon pulse emitted from Alice [94] or in other words the attenuation for
i-photon pulses:
Yi = Y0 + ηi − Y0ηi
≈ Y0 + ηi, (5.3)
with the probability for a dark count event Y0 in case Alice did not send a pulse.
The product of two small terms can be omitted here.
The actual registered fraction Qµ of the sent poissonian states with mean photon
number µ – the only figure directly accessible from the experiment to calculate the
attenuation – can then be written as [94]
Qµ =
∞∑
i=0
Qi =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
µie−µ
i!
(5.4)
eqs. (5.2), (5.3)
= Y0 + 1− e−ηµ (5.5)
Qµ is called the gain of pulses with mean intensity µ; the Qi are the gain of i-photon
pulses respectively. However, the Qi are not accessible from the experiment, as
the actual photon number of a pulse leaving Alice is only defined on average and
1The ad hoc estimation for the channel attenuation in eq. (5.1) actually delivers good results as
will be shown after equation (5.6) . Nevertheless, the calculation of the attenuation shall be used
to introduce the quantities needed later.
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Table 5.2: Contributions to the overall attenuation. The attenuation of
beam wander and broadening was calculated and found to be negligible in this
scenario [83].
time filtering −4.2 dB see section 5.1.3
detector efficiency −4.2 dB APD efficiency [85]
interference filter ≈ −3 dB peak transmission −2.2 dB
OGS optics −3 dB non ideal optics [83]
atmospheric att. −6 dB simulation [83], visibility 50 km
OGS collection eff. −15 dB link budget calculations [83]
tracking losses −4 dB link budget calculations [83]
diode coupling losses −2 dB link budget calculations [83]
estimated total att. −41.4 dB
observed total att. −42.7 dB see equation (5.6)
once the pulse has arrived at Bob’s its photon number might have changed due to
the channel attenuation. The meaning of yield and gain values is summarized in
table 5.1.
The channel attenuation can now conveniently be calculated from (5.4) with the
values from the experiment Qµ = 2.86× 10−5 and Y0 = 1.75× 10−6:
η =
− ln(1−Qµ + Y0)
µ
= 5.37× 10−5 = −42.7 dB (5.6)
For comparison, the estimation according to equation (5.1) yields η ≈ 5.73×10−5 =
42.4dB.
As already mentioned, this value comprises all attenuating effects between the
FELT2 terminal dome, which represents the border of the secure Alice enclave, and
the registered events after time filtering. The complete link budget is summarized
in 5.2. Especially the contributions to the attenuation due to atmospheric effects
(attenuation, turbulence) are simulated values only, yet all contributions sum up to
−41.4 dB which is close to the observed value of −42.7 dB.
5.2.2 Sifted Key Rate and QBER
After the synchronization and time filtering as described above (§ 5.1.1), the BB84
protocol can proceed with the sifting process. The resulting sifted key is constructed
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Figure 5.3: QBER and sifted key length over the time filtering full window
width τf . The straight lines indicate the behavior for τf longer than the
width of the received pulses. As the acceptance window is widened, more
and more signal can be accepted, but at the same time, more background
events contribute to the sifted key. At some point, the gain in sifted key is
entirely due to background events and the slope becomes proportional to the
background count rate. Similarly, the QBER increases due to the successively
larger fraction of background events in the sifted key and would eventually
saturate at 0.5.
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from all qubits Bob detected and for which his basis choice agrees with Alice’s and
should ideally be identical for both partners. Yet, in the presence of noise, it is
inevitable that a certain number of errors occur in the sifted key, which give rise to
the so called quantum bit error ratio QBER. As already indicated in section 5.1.3,
the actual sifted key rate N˙s and the QBER after time filtering are dependent on the
filtering parameter τf . The rates for the analyzed data set are depicted in figure 5.3
for 0.2 ns ≤ τf ≤ 3 ns. The asymptotic behavior of the sifted key length is nicely
correlated with the background event rate r0 as for τf larger than the received pulse
width
δNs
δτf
=
r0Nsent
2
(5.7)
holds – half of the background events occur in the “wrong” basis and thus do not
contribute. Nsent = Tf = 5.75 × 109 (for T = 575 s and f = 10MHz) is the total
number of signals sent and at the same time the number of receiver time slots in
the usable experiment time T . The ordinate intersection estimates (hypothetical)
the total number of signals after sifting Nrec/2 = 185360 present in the data set
(without background events and before time filtering – this number is of course not
accessible as a perfect signal filtering is not possible).
Similarly, the QBER increases with τf as the SNR gets worse. Its evolution for
large τf indicated in figure 5.3 is
e =
Esig + τfr0Nsent/2
Nrec + τfr0Nsent
, (5.8)
which estimates the QBER e as the fraction of erroneous bits due to signal (Esig) and
background events in the total number of bits. (5.8) would eventually saturate and
approach 0.5 for larger τf corresponding to the case of a sifted key composed almost
entirely from background events. The constant number Esig/Nrec can be regarded
as the QBER of the signal in the absence of background events. In the notation
introduced above, one can also calculate this technical error as [95]:
etech =
eQµ − Y0/2
(1− e−ηµ) (5.9)
For the optimal τf = 0.5 ns (see analysis in section 5.3.2), the QBER and the sifted
key rate are plotted in figure 5.4 for intervals of one second per data point. The
mean sifted key rate is N˙s = 145 s−1 (Ns = 82308 for the whole passage) and the
mean QBER is e = 4.8%. The technical error according to equation (5.9) evaluates
to etech = 1.8%. This shows the significant contribution of background noise in this
experiment, but also proves the polarization compensation to work fine.
An analysis of the sifted key reveals that the distribution of “0” and “1” in the
sifted key is biased (p(0) = 42% and p(1) = 58% respectively, see also tab. 5.3).
This reduces the extractable randomness, which is given by the min entropy [96]
h∞(p) = − log2 pmax (5.10)
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Figure 5.4: Sifted key rate (green) and QBER (blue) during the QKD
transmission. Each point marks the average value for one second. Bold lines
indicate mean values.
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Table 5.3: Distribution of bit and basis values in the sifted key.
basis sum
{H,V } {±45}
bit
1 32.5% 25.5% 58%
0 14% 28% 42%
sum 46.5% 53.5%
of one sifted key bit to h∞(0.42) = 0.786 and has to be taken into account in privacy
amplification. However, balancing the efficiencies of the four channels by additional
attenuators in the stronger ones would reduce the size of the sifted key by 16% only.
Similarly, the bases Bob used to measure are not equally distributed. 46.5% of
the sifted key bits were measured in the {±45} basis compared to 53.5% measured
in the {H,V } basis. This asymmetry could increase the success probabilities for an
eavesdropper in guessing the right basis. However, there are techniques to quantify
this advantage for an attacker and to incorporate it in privacy amplification [66].
The reason for these aberrations are non uniform APD efficiencies of the four
APDs, not perfectly balanced beam splitters in the Bob module and the attenuation
introduced by the half wave plate for the diagonal basis. It is preferable and
practicable to eliminate these asymmetries in the hardware compared to any post
processing. Therefore, these effects will not be included in the evaluation of the
achievable secure key rate.
Note that the classical communication normally involved in the sifting to agree
on a subset of the sent bits as key bit candidates could be omitted here as firstly, Bob
knows the PRBS used to generate the qubit stream and secondly Alice does not need
to know the final key in this demonstration. It has to be stressed, however, that the
classical channel would be readily available to perform this protocol task whenever
QKD is implemented as an add-on for a conventional bidirectional communication
system. Also here, the host system is fully operational even with the QKD hardware
installed. Yet, the FELT2 at this stage only provides a unidirectional channel from
the airplane to the ground, which is used here to transmit the clock. Current
74 CHAPTER 5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
development of the DLR system, however, will enable bidirectional communication
soon.
5.2.3 Pointing Stability
The sifted key rates depicted in figure 5.4 already prove a stable pointing for the
whole passage of about 10min. The pointing accuracy of the terminal could further
be characterized by the InGaAs-camera of the FELT2: As this device is not part of the
pointing control loop, which uses the quadrant diode only to generate an error signal,
it delivers an independent measure for the mean pointing error. Unfortunately, the
camera’s resolution is not sufficient for a precise determination of the pointing, as the
OGS beacon remains on the center pixel most of the time. This means that only an
upper bound of 150µrad can be specified for the mean pointing error corresponding
to the angular width of one camera pixel. The typical tracking accuracy of the OGS
being stationary and therefore not subject to severe vibrations is about 20 µrad [83].
5.2.4 Polarization Compensation
The low technical error rate calculated in section 5.2.2 above, together with the fact
that there was no manual interaction performed during the key transmission, already
shows that the polarization compensation could be accomplished well with the
designed strategy and hardware. Furthermore, there seem to be no severe systematic
deviations in the compensation scheme as manual variation of the compensation
parameters during prior passages could not improve the QBER.
The dynamic performance of the setup, however, can only be judged by the data
in figure 5.4 and figure 5.5 together. The latter shows the actual pointing directions
in the FELT2 for the duration of the QKD transmission together with the calculated
orientations of the compensating wave plates. While the elevation angle is nearly
stationary apart from noise, there is a variation of about 15◦ in the azimuth mirror
position. This clearly shows the necessity of the online polarization control even on
the circular path as the azimuth angle translates directly to the (linear) rotation
of the polarization (see fig. 3.18) and would have caused directly a QBER of about
6.7% in absence of other error sources. The main cause for the deviation of the
aircraft orientation from the tangential direction was wind coming from the east.
While on the circular path the compensation scheme performed well, almost
exclusively the effects of the azimuth rotation of the coudé beam path were relevant
in this experiment. These lead to a rotation of the FoV and at the same time of
the polarization, however, only around the axis perpendicular to the equator of the
Poincaré sphere. This idealized situation would require the quarter wave plates to
rotate exactly like the FoV and the half wave plate to rotate half the way. In the
experiment, however, the distortions to the polarization were more complex so that
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Figure 5.5: Angular positions of the FELT2 elevation and azimuth coarse
pointing mirrors and the wave plates for polarization compensation for the
duration of the QKD transmission. The variation of the azimuth in spite of the
circular path is due to the wind coming from the east and the distance between
the OGS and the center of the aircraft trajectory (the airport coordinates
programmed in the aircraft auto pilot). The spike at 19:54 results from an
uncaught transmission error of the UHF link.
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this pure behavior is not apparent from figure 5.5 for the second quarter and the
half wave plate.
As a consequence of the circular path, it is not possible to fully judge the
performance of the compensation scheme for arbitrary polarization rotations on
basis of the data aquired in this experiment. This will have to be characterized in a
next step to enable future non circular trajectories of the airplane which will cause
more complex polarization rotations. An important task will also be to identify
and eliminate numerical weaknesses of the strategy described in section 3.5.4 under
pathological starting conditions.
5.3 Secure Key Rate after Privacy Amplification
The sifted key rate together with the QBER and the repetition frequency, provide
comprehensible and objective information about the performance and potential of
a QKD system. For the final figure of merit of a QKD experiment, however, the
actual secure key rate has to be evaluated. As mentioned in the introduction to
this chapter, here, a hypothetical secure key rate will be calculated for this system
achievable once all remaining elements will be implemented.
5.3.1 Weak Coherent Pulses and Decoy States
In this experiment, QKD is implemented using weak coherent pulses (WCPs), as the
preparation of true single photon pulses requires a comparably huge technological
overhead [97–99]. Yet, a WCP fundamentally contradicts the idea of a qubit, which
is by definition a single quantum entity. Nevertheless, WCPs are widely used in
quantum key distribution experiments [15, 25, 95, 100] and with the decoy state
encoding and analysis [80, 81], a specialized measure was invented to upper bound
the fraction of multi photon pulses, which led to raw key bits. With this estimation,
the extractable secure key rate from weak pulse QKD can be calculated following the
lines of [66].
WCPs exhibit a Poissonian photon number distribution. Namely the probability
Pµ(n) to find n photons in a pulse of mean intensity µ, measured in photons per
pulse, is given by
Pµ(n) =
µne−µ
n!
. (5.11)
Therefore, also pulses with more than one single photon occur inevitably with a
non zero probability Pµ(n > 1) = 1 − e−µ − µe−µ and the key bit candidates they
produce are insecure. An obvious exploit of this effect would be to strip off one
photon from all these pulses, store them, and measure them after Alice and Bob
reveal their measurement bases while at the same time blocking parts of or even all
single photon pulses (confer Photon Number Splitting [82, 101, 102]).
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In a first attempt to still enable a secure key distribution with WCPs, one could
eliminate as many bit of information from the raw key as multi photon pulses were
sent (estimated from the Poissonian distribution), regarding these as tagged [66]
and thus known to the adversary usually called Eve. This simple strategy, however,
would fail to produce secure key even for moderate channel attenuation: Once
Pµ(n ≥ 2) ≥ η, one has to assume that no single photon events at all contributed
to the raw key and consequently discard it completely.
The theory introducing decoy states provides much tighter estimations for the
fraction of raw key bits resulting from multi photon events. This enables QKD
with WCPs on much longer distances: While the key generation rate R for WCP-
based systems according to [66] drops with (e−η)2 (for optimal µ), with decoy state
encoding the relation is R ∝ e−η and the ranges become comparable to systems
equipped with true single photon sources [80, 81] which show the same dependency
in η (see fig. 5.6).
For the decoy method, m different decoy states with mean intensities νi, i < m
are sent through the quantum channel, randomly alternating with the signal pulses.
While an adversary could in principle measure the photon number of a pulse, this
gives him no possibility to determine the class, signal or i-decoy, the pulse belongs to.
The probability to find an n-photon pulse is non zero for all mean pulse intensities.
Therefore any attempt to suppress single photon pulses necessarily affects all pulse
classes equally but will change their photon number distribution differently. After
the transmission, Alice announces which pulses were of which class and together
with Bob calculates the gain values Qµ and Qνi for all m classes separately. In
case of any photon-number depending attack, they will notice different changes in
the gain values Qµ and Qνi which allow them to tightly estimate the gain of single
photon pulses Q1. Of course, an essential assumption here is, that all mean pulse
intensities are equally attenuated in the channel.
As mentioned before, decoy state encoding was not implemented here and the
demonstrated transmission is therefore susceptible to the powerful photon number
splitting attack. Yet, the experimental results allow for an evaluation of the secure
key generation rate under the assumption that decoy states had been sent as
described in the remaining part of this section.
With the additional information Alice and Bob get from the decoy state analysis
about the photon number statistics for all pulse classes, they can calculate the secure
key generation rate R following Ma et al. [94]. The calculation combines the decoy
state method with the work of Gottesman et al. [66]:
R ≥ 1
2
(
Q1
(
1−H2(e1)
)−Qµf(eµ)H2(eµ)) (5.12)
eµ is the QBER on signal states and e1 the error ratio on single photon pulses only.
f(eµ) is the efficiency of the error correction algorithm relative to the Shannon
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limit [53]. Note that, following the lines of [94], the secret key is distilled exclusively
from the signal pulses with intensity µ and thus, in the following Q1 is considered
the single photon gain of this pulse class only.
Analogous to equation (2.2), the above relation can be understood quantitatively
in the following way: The secure key generation rate R is lower bounded by the gain
of true single photon pulses contributing to the raw key reduced by the amount of
information an eavesdropper might have gained as indicated by the QBER on these
single photon pulses (−Q1H2(e1)). Furthermore, the information disclosed during
privacy amplification Qµf(eµ)H2(eµ) has to be eliminated (subtracted). Finally
the factor 1/2 is due to the decoy protocol only providing useful results in case of
matching bases.
Of course, neither e1, the error rate of single photon pulses, nor Q1, the corre-
sponding gain of signal pulses (eq. (5.4)), is directly accessible in the experiment.
Even photon number resolving detectors at Bob’s could not determine the number
of photons in the initial pulse sent by Alice. Yet, the decoy theory provides tight
bounds eU1 ≥ e1 and QL1 ≤ Q1 in the respective worst case direction, which enable a
calculation of a lower bound on the secure key rate.
Generally, an infinite number of decoy intensities νi would be optimal, however, it
is impossible to determine an infinite number of Qνi with the necessary precision on
a finite experimental data set. In the following, the description is therefore restricted
to the so called vacuum+weak decoy protocol using only two intensities ν0 = 0 and
ν1 = ν < µ, which is optimal for finite transmission durations [81]. Then, the
aforementioned worst case bounds eU1 and QL1 , assuming Poissonian photon number
statistics of the sent pulses, take the form [94]
QL1 =
µ2e−µ
µν − ν2
(
Qνe
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
Y0
)
≤ Q1 (5.13)
and
eU1 =
eµQµ − 1/2Y0e−µ
QL1
≥ e1 . (5.14)
Substituting these estimates back into equation (5.12) provides a lower bound
on the secure key rate. This only depends on quantities which were either set
prior to the experiment (the pulse intensities µ and ν) or can be measured in the
key exchange (the gains Qµ and Qν , the error rate eµ, and the probability of dark
counts (Y0, measured when Alice sent vacuum pulses ν0).
In this way, the decoy method enables the substitution of a true single photon
source with a transmitter preparing WCPs while preserving the security of the
distributed key and at the same time the dependence of the key generation rate R on
η. Moreover, the optimal pulse intensity for a wide range of channel attenuation is
close to µ = 0.5 [94] and the transmitters can be operated in the GHz regime [100].
Therefore, as of now, decoy QKD systems usually outperform setups that encode
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single photons, as there the mean intensities per pulse often suffer from poor
collection efficiency and the repetition rate is limited.
5.3.2 Secure Key Rate Evaluation
Parameter Optimization
For the present experiment, the calculation of the maximum secure key rate is based
on the values of the mean pulse intensity µ, the QBER eµ, the gain of signal states
Qµ, the yield of vacuum pulses Y0, and the total channel attenuation η, which were
all measured in the experiment.
For the evaluation according to the decoy state protocol, additionally, a decoy
pulse intensity ν has to be chosen and the corresponding gain Qν is calculated from
equation (5.4). Furthermore, the frequencies of decoy and vacuum pulses, Pν and P0,
in the sent stream have to be determined. In this oﬄine analysis, an optimization
in Mathematica is used to find the set of parameters resulting in the highest secure
key rate according to equation (5.12).
However, for an infinite long key exchange, the secure key rate is maximized
for vanishing decoy and vacuum pulse frequencies and a near zero decoy pulse
intensity [94]. While these would indeed be the optimal parameters, this is only
true as long as the necessary quantities for the equations (5.12) to (5.14) can be
determined with a reasonable accuracy, too. Of course, this is not practicable
for ν, Pν and P0 close to 0 and for a reasonable statement about the secure
key rate in this experiment, one has to consider the finite amount of signal
received, which inevitably leads to noise in the measured parameters. Therefore,
assuming a Gaussian error distribution, all measured gain values and the QBER in
equations (5.12) to (5.14) are substituted with according worst case estimations by
sd standard deviations (STD) [95]:
Qµ,ν → Q±µ,ν = Qµ,ν
(
1± sd√
NsentPµ,νQµ,ν
)
eµ → e±µ = eµ
(
1± sd√
NsentPµQµeµ
) (5.15)
With these substitutions, a confidence interval of one STD sD = 1, and a time
filter window width of τf = 0.5 ns an optimization for maximum secure key rate
delivers practicable parameters ν, Pν , and P0 for operation of a decoy QKD system:
ν = 0.076, Pν = 12.8 %, P0 = 9.5 % (5.16)
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The result of the optimization heavily depends on the total amount of signal
that could be registered. Therefore, τf is a crucial parameter here, too (see § 5.1.3):
For a wider filtering window, i.e. a larger τf , the sifted key gets longer, which makes
the worst case estimations in equation (5.15) less restrictive. On the other hand,
this would result in a slightly higher QBER which, at the same time, decreases the
secure key rate. Consequently, the optimization was done for different time filtering
windows in 50 ps steps. The result was already given in figure 5.2 (page 66) where
the secure key rate, plotted together with the QBER over τf , shows a maximum for
τf = 0.5 ns.
Secure Key Rate
Operating the QKD system supplemented with the ability to send decoy states and
using µ = 0.5 and the parameters in equation (5.16) on the quantum channel as
observed in the experiment (i.e. with the same noise and attenuation) would result
in an asymptotic secure key rate of 7.9 bit/s calculated according to equations (5.12)
to (5.14). Considering the repetition rate of f = 10MHz this corresponds to a secure
key generation rate per sent qubit of 7.9× 10−7.
In this calculation, statistical noise in the parameter estimation is neglected (see
below). Furthermore, information leaks via side channels are not considered in this
evaluation as these can be made arbitrarily small by technological means.
Finite Key Considerations
In a realistic scenario, the number of signals received will always be finite. Moreover,
the block size in privacy amplification, i.e., the number of bits which are processed at
once, may be limited due to the available memory and processing power especially
in high rate QKD applications. This gives rise to statistical fluctuations on the
measured parameters which enter the secure key rate calculation and was soon
recognized [67] to impose security flaws when not handled properly: For example,
the information leakage indicated by the observed QBER via the binary entropy
function in equation (5.12) might be smaller than Eve’s actual information gain in
case she was lucky to cause less errors in Bob’s signals on a specific finite sample.
Only asymptotically, the frequency of quantum bit errors becomes equal to the ratio
of errors in the sifted string, the QBER, and allows for a secure calculation of the
information leakage.
An ad hoc approach to incorporate these effects uses the worst case estimations
from equation (5.15) [95]: For sd = 1 the secure key rate for this experiment drops
from 7.9 bit/s to 4.8 bit/s. Yet, this confidence interval is obviously to small for a
truly secure key as there remains a probability, adhering to the assumed Gaussian
distribution, of 31.7% for each measured parameter to exceed its assumed worst
case boundary. In this case the information gain of an eavesdropper would remain
underestimated. A confidence interval on the parameters of ten STDs is often used
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Table 5.4: Secure key length and rate of this experiment asymtotically and for
a worst case estimation of the measured parameters by one and two STD. For
comparison, the asymtotic key rate of a true single photon QKD transmitter
with the same mean intensity µ = 0.5 is given.
worst case est. secure key rate tot. length
sd (bit/s) (bit)
sifted key 145 82308
decoy asymtotically 7.9 4484
decoy 1 std 4.8 2724
decoy 2 std 1.8 1021
single photon QKD asymtotically 64 36329
for “unconditional” security [95]; sd = 10 reduces the probability to underestimate
the information leakage due to a single parameter to 1.5× 10−23. Unfortunately, for
this experiment the secure key rate already almost vanishes for sd = 2 (see tab. 5.4).
In Figure 5.6, the key rate is visualized over the channel attenuation for 0, 1, and
2 STDs and compared to the case of a true single photon QKD transmitter with the
same mean intensity µ = 0.5.
Recent security proofs for QKD make use of an uncertainty relation for the so
called min- and max-entropy [9, 68, 103] to derive secure key rates under realistic
assumptions concerning finite key effects [104]. For decoy state QKD, however, this
treatment of finite size effects is not yet completely solved. Proposals to accomplish
this can be found in [105–109], however, the security considerations for the decoy
parameters differ between these works and appear to be conservative. For the current
experiment, an analysis along these lines does not allow for the distillation of a secure
key.
5.4 Discussion
In this work, a first proof of principle demonstration of BB84 quantum key
distribution from an airplane to ground could be successfully performed. This
comprises the design and the seamless integration of QKD hardware into an existing
system for classical communication, the precise compensation of mutual rotations of
the polarization reference frame, and an accurate pointing to establish and maintain
the quantum channel between the aircraft and the ground station telescope.
All parameters to judge the QKD performance of the system and the quantum
channel could be measured and the calculation of the secure key rate under the
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Figure 5.6: Secure key generation rate per sent qubit depending on the
channel attenuation for a decoy state analysis of this experiment with worst
case estimations of 0 (asymtotic case), 1 and 10 STDs. The dot marks the
observed result. While for one STD, the drop in key generation rate is only
about 2dB, for 10 STDs confidence intervall no secure key can be distilled at all.
For comparison, also the expected secure key rate of true single photon QKD
operating on the same channel and with the same mean intensity is visualized.
For clarity, the red line marks the key generation rate of 1bit/s at the used
repetition frequency of 10MHz.
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Figure 5.7: Future improvements in order to eliminate preparation side
channels of the Alice module. Once, a robust heat management is established
for the FELT2 and bright signals are no longer required from the QKD
transmitter, the spatial, spectral and temporal side channels can be eliminated.
assumptions detailed in section 5.3.2 shows that for example more than 10 symmetric
keys for the classical encryption scheme AES [2, 3] – 256 indicates the key length
in bit – can be exchanged in one aircraft passage (see tab. 5.4, 1 STD).
The application of the information theoretically secure one time pad encryption
scheme [1] requires a key of the same length as the data to be encrypted. Therefore,
the achieved secure key rate in this experiment would allow for a very limited
communication only. Moreover, the system has to be improved to become robust
against attacks on the photon number of the transmitter pulses or side channels in
order to render the according assumptions in the analysis obsolete and finally arrive
at an unconditionally secure system.
Therefore, on the way to a prototype for commercial and secure QKD applica-
tions, there are still several details to be addressed. These shall be discussed together
with their implications on the performance of a next generation experiment in the
following.
5.4.1 QKD Transmitter and Receiver
The limited experiment time of at most only four short flights was a major concern
in the development of the Alice module for this experiment and the design aimed
to make a complete failure of the module as unlikely as possible. Therefore,
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simplifications and compromises in certain details had to be adopted in favor of
the needed robustness that will have to be addressed in future experiments.
First of all, decoy states will have to be implemented in the Alice module. This
can be accomplished using an eight channel transmitter module as developed and
used in [16, 25] to produce the necessary decoy and signal states with four laser diodes
each. The third intensity, the vacuum pulse, is trivially realized by suppressing the
respective pulses completely. This approach, however, requires more complicated
optics which is undesirable in view of miniaturization and industrial manufacturing.
Thus, alternatively, decoy states could be produced electronically, for example by
coupling two laser drivers to every laser diode, each calibrated to deposit a different
pulse energy Eµ and Eν respectively. In this way, decoy state preparation could be
enabled for the Alice module built here, too, by mere exchange of the electronics
board. On Bob’s side, the integration of a decoy state analysis only requires for a
slightly extended classical post processing (see § 5.3.1) which is a matter of software
only.
In a next stage of the experiment, there will be no need for bright output powers.
Operation in the mW range as well as pulsing with several hundreds of photons
per pulse was incredibly helpful in the preparation of this experiment but can be
omitted in the future with the experience acquired here. Therefore, a much more
restrictive mode filter and a narrow interference filter can be afforded while still
reliably providing the necessary QKD intensities in the sub single photon regime.
Thereby, two severe side channels – the spatial and spectral distinguishabilities of
the four laser diodes – can be eliminated at the same time (see fig. 5.7).
Further, a whole set of improvements is enabled once the FELT2 allows for
heat exchange with the surrounding to dissipate the terminal excess heat: The
temperature stabilization of the laser diodes and the interference filter mentioned
above would guarantee stable output wavelengths and thus enable a more restrictive
filtering at the receiver. In this way one would reduce the background noise in
the signal significantly. Additionally, faster electronics enabled by better heat
management would allow to reduce the QKD pulse length and to eliminate the delay
between the four diodes, closing the third side channel associated with the photons
degrees of freedom (see fig. 5.7). Finally, the repetition rate could be increased by
possibly two orders of magnitude to above 1GHz.
A future FPGA-based circuitry of Alice and Bob will make the implementation of
the complete post processing straight forward: sifting, error correction and privacy
amplification can easily be performed by modern FPGAs as well as the necessary
communication, provided a bidirectional optical data channel is made available by
the classical subsystem. Such an FPGA system could already be demonstrated by
Zhang et al. [110]. Recently, also fast radio links for air to ground communication
become available that could provide the classical back-channel for unidirectional
optical systems, too (a prototype capable of up to a few Mbit/s was already tested
during this experiment).
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Finally, the Alice module will need a reliable source of true randomness for
generation of the secret key. For this purpose, physical or even quantum random
number generators [111] are by now readily available and can be interfaced to the
FPGA. Yet, the BB84 protocol needs two bit of randomness for every qubit and the
decoy method requires a small additional amount of randomness (depending on the
distribution of decoy and signal states) to select one of the three pulse intensities.
The required bit rate of a random number generator, therefore, is about a factor of 2
to 3 higher then the repetition rate of the QKD system. As commercial quantum
random number generators are limited to rates of tens of MHz [44, 111, 112], for the
time being, they will have to be parallelized or used to seed pseudo random number
generators to enable a bit stream in the GHz regime. Nevertheless, quantum random
number generators are being actively developed and bit rates well beyond 100MHz
have already been demonstrated [113, 114].
The above proposed modifications are necessary to establish the systems
unconditional security: The increased sifted bit rate will allow for the rigorous
analysis of finite key effects as envisioned in section 5.3.2 and the transmitter side
channels can be eliminated. All these improvements are in principle practicable even
in the constricted room on board of an aircraft or satellite.
5.4.2 Classical Subsystem
While the classical subsystem performed excellent for this demonstration, there are
some points that have to be addressed in order to enable the complete BB84 protocol
and to provide the environment for an unconditionally secure QKD transmitter.
First, as the classical optical link worked unidirectionally only at the time of this
experiment, no online sifting could be performed. However, current development of
the platform at the DLR will enable bidirectional communication even with a mobile
ground station [115] so that the classical channel can be provided as requested by
the protocol.
Another important issue is the thermal management of the airborne terminal
already mentioned before to overcome design constraints for a new QKD transmitter.
While the required power consumption for temperature stabilized components
should not exceed a few Watt, a cooling mechanism will definitely be necessary
to eliminate vulnerabilities due to the state preparation as analyzed in [70]. The
heat exchange could be realized by a heat pipe connecting an interior heat sink with
the aircraft or terminal outer skin cooled by the constant air stream of the moving
aircraft. This strategy would also solve the laser safety considerations claimed by
the authorities in conjunction with conventional ventilation slots through which laser
radiation might escape under faulty conditions.
The pointing accuracy achieved here was sufficient with regard to the still
relatively wide QKD beam as it was no major source of attenuation (see tab. 5.2).
From Figure 5.4 the long term stability becomes evident, too. Apart from sub second
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losses, there are no complete link failures during the whole passage and only a slight
decrease of the sifted key rate is noticeable. Responsible for this are probably small
imperfections of the beam alignment in the FELT2 relative to the systems axis, which
also manifested themselves as different optimal values for the pointing control offset
vector (see section 4.3.4) depending on the aircraft direction around the OGS –
clock-wise or counter-clock-wise. Moreover, the optical system of a next experiment
will have to guarantee perfect stability for the coalignment of the pointing axis and
the QKD-beam without the need for manual tweaks in flight (see § 4.2.1) which can
already be accomplished by a more stable optical breadboard.
Especially in view of a future satellite based application, the QKD beam will
have to be much better collimated in order to bridge the longer distances with
high efficiency. This will enforce larger effective transmitter apertures in the regime
of 10 cm [116] and even better pointing accuracy. However, in this demonstration,
a major challenge was to decouple the optical system, both passively using shock
mounts and actively with the FPA, from the vibrating body of the aircraft, which is
not necessary to that extent on board a satellite. There, even an open-loop pointing
of the space terminal based on the known satellite trajectory is assumed to achieve a
precision of already about 25 µrad [32]. The situation appears to be more demanding
on board of the international space station (ISS) as the high activity there constantly
excites a multitude of vibrational modes of which an estimated number of 5000 (200)
are below 50 (15)Hz [117] starting from 0.06Hz. These slow deformations of the
structure of the ISS would need to be compensated by an FPA with sufficient angular
range. Moreover, the mounting position of a future QKD-system on the ISS would
have to be carefully chosen in order to minimize large amplitude angular vibrations.
On the ground, the OGS tracking will also benefit from the a priori known
trajectory of a ballistic body in LEO as compared to the aircraft. Yet, a fast fine
pointing will, nevertheless, be necessary to compensate the effects of air turbulence.
5.4.3 Secure Key Rate
The secure key rate calculated under the assumptions as detailed in section 5.3.2
is only meant to give an idea of the systems performance and to help identify the
necessary improvements. Under a rigorous analysis, as mentioned in section 5.3.2,
no secure key could be distilled from the quantum transmission. The main reasons
are the limited key length and the reasonably high total QBER. Yet, for both these
issues, there is much room for improvements (see also tab. 5.5):
The amount of raw key linearly increases with the system’s repetition frequency,
which promises advances of at least one to two orders of magnitude. On Bob’s side,
the detectors can handle much higher signal rates before dead time effects become
relevant. The increased rates, however, will demand for a correspondingly better
time synchronization of Bob’s detectors to reliably assign signal events to transmitter
time slots avoiding influence from stray light (already demonstrated in [118, 119]).
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Table 5.5: Overview of future improvements to the experimental setups which
will boost both the speed and thereby the security of the transmission by
enabling secure key distillation under rigorous finite key analysis.
improvements to enable benefit
quieter detectors,
better spectral
filtering
reduced background noise
by factor 5
QBER due to background
noise < 1%
usage of full
terminal exit
aperture of 30mm
narrower beam collimation,
waist diameter 12mm
6 dB more signal at
receiver, QBER due to
background noise < 1%
faster Alice
electronics
repetition rate of up to 1GHz up to 20 dB speedup in
sifted key rate
reduced
synchronization
jitter
less signal loss in time filtering up to 3 dB speedup in
sifted key rate
If this overall temporal jitter can be addressed, additionally the signal loss of 4.2 dB
in the time filtering step can be reduced in favor of the sifted key length.
Furthermore, the optical coupling of the telescopes will have to be improved,
which would also raise the signal to noise ratio. An advanced mode filter, i.e.,
beam preparation, together with optimized telescope optics will allow for a much
narrower collimation. Even in case only the current telescope aperture of d = 30mm
is available, this then results in a diffraction limited full divergence of 90 µrad (waist
ω0 = 0.2d). The corresponding beam diameter at the OGS telescope is 1.8m, which
gives about 6 dB more signal than the configuration demonstrated here.
In total, from the increased rates and enhanced optics of a next generation
experiment, one can expect more then 26 dB increase in the raw signal rate at the
slightly reduced total quantum channel attenuation of 37 dB, which would result in
107 bit of sifted key from one aircraft passage.
Additionally, it will be important to improve the QBER. About two thirds of
the errors are currently due to dark count events and stray light in roughly equal
parts. Because in this application, APDs are needed with a reasonably large active
area to allow for a minimum of residual pointing errors, they will always suffer from
a significant dark count rate. Below 200 counts per second and detector seems,
however, a realistic specification, which corresponds to a reduction of dark counts
by a factor of 5. Furthermore, the contribution from stray light will be drastically
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reduced by the narrow interference filter mentioned above. If there a conservatively
estimated factor of 5 can be realized, too, this would result in half the total QBER
compared to the value observed here and improve the asymptotic secure key rate
under otherwise same conditions to 38 bit/s (+6.8 dB).
The results of the automatic polarization compensation could not be improved
manually to arrive at lower QBER. Thus, polarization dependent reflectivities and
transmissions due to the finite quality of the optical components and coatings will
have to be eliminated or compensated where possible to further reduce the number
of erroneous bits from actual signal events.
In summary, the estimated parameters for the sifted key length and QBER of a
next generation QKD experiment on a channel as observed here allow for a secure key
exchange even under state of the art finite key privacy amplification [105]. While the
key generation rates would still only be in the regime of tens of bit/s (6 kbit/passage),
more than 20 unconditionally secure keys for classical symmetric encryptors working
on basis of AES can be provided in one aircraft passage.
Chapter 6
Summary and Outlook
In the presented experiment, the feasibility of a quantum key exchange according
to the BB84 protocol between an aircraft and an optical ground station could be
successfully demonstrated. To this aim, a transmitter for polarization encoded,
faint pulse QKD was integrated with the free-space experimental laser terminal 2
(FELT2) of the DLR and the optical ground station in Oberpfaffenhofen near Munich,
Germany was supplemented with an according quantum receiver.
With the aircraft at a distance of 20 km and flying at a speed of 290 km/h,
sifted key could be generated at a rate of 145bit/s. The observed QBER was 4.8%
and contained a significant contribution from stray light and dark counts (3%).
Assuming the implementation of the decoy state method, secure key can be distilled
at an asymptotic rate of 7.9 bit/s. While at this point, finite key effects could not
be rigorously be accounted for, thorough analysis reveals, that unconditional secure
key at similar rates can be enabled in a next step of the experiment by advanced
electronics and tighter filtering. Online sifting and post processing will immediately
be possible once the classical host system allows for bidirectional communication,
too.
The implementation of the QKD hardware could be realized as an add-on while
the classical host system remained fully operational. Even though neither the
FELT2 nor the OGS were intended to accommodate additional components, only
minor changes were required in order to enable this demonstration. This underlines
the suitability of QKD as a supplementary technology for classical communication
devices.
Already in this demonstration, the quantum transmitter and receiver were
designed as integrated modules and further miniaturization will allow for their
implementation in nearly all classical communication systems operating on a direct
line of sight: As of today, there is a variety of solutions for high speed data links,
both free-space optical (FSO) and on basis of point-to-point directional radio. All
these systems could implement cryptographic means to secure the communication
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and thus could benefit from a QKD add-on. Additionally, it has to be stressed, that
in contrast to frequent claims, narrow beam FSO links do not offer intrinsic security
against eavesdropping as stray light produced at the transmitter or the receiver can
be collected and analyzed with suitable telescopes.
With the fine pointing assemblys (FPAs) in the flight terminal and on the
ground station, the DLR contributed an essential prerequisite to the success of this
experiment. The stability as well as the absolute efficiency of the quantum channel
could only be achieved with the advanced accuracy enabled by the additional fine
and fast pointing facilities. The increased pointing performance will in turn also
boost the classical communication speed and extend the possible operation ranges.
For links to systems in LEO, the techniques employed here will certainly need some
refinement to meet the even more critical accuracy requirements. This is, however,
considered practicable [32] even under the space, weight, and power restrictions on
board of a satellite.
The polarization encoding in this mobile scenario made a compensation scheme
necessary to make up for mutual rotations of the transmitter’s and receiver’s
reference frames. Even on the circular path, the online readjustment of the wave
plates turned out to be vital in order to maintain low error rates. Finally, the small
technical error of 1.8% contributing to the overall QBER proofs a successful and
precise polarization compensation. It has to be noted, however, that the design of
the pointing system has substantial influence on the complexity of the polarization
compensation. The coudé geometry of the FELT2 telescope produced rotations
depending on the pointing direction which could be modeled and compensated
well. There are, however, other configurations that might introduce more complex
distortions. In fact the need for a compensation scheme can also be avoided partly or
even entirely: If transmitter and receiver are both azimuth/elevation mounted and
moved as a unit, there are no moving mirrors and the relevant rotations are entirely
of spatial nature. In this case a single half wave plate is sufficient to reestablish the
common reference frame. In [120], an otherwise similar QKD experiment linking to
a hot-air balloon is presented which is, however, realized without any polarization
compensation. This is possible as the vertical direction is always well defined for
the balloon. For satellite terminals, the influence of a single tip/tilt mirror in front
of the telescope is investigated and also reference beams are discussed, either at a
different wavelength or time multiplexed [43].
The absolute security measures enabled by QKD systems certainly will not be
the answer to the security issues of ordinary home or office computers and their
communication via the internet. This is not only because the network topology
necessary to provide a quantum channel for every terminal, essentially a quantum
internet, would be excessively expensive. In fact, an adversary will always go
for the weakest link in the security chain and in order to establish and maintain
data integrity and confidentiality, a secure key exchange and a perfect encryption
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algorithm are only two necessary prerequisites. Most attacks registered today target
specific erroneous software implementations or the user himself by forging mails and
websites. Moreover, the limited possible damage associated with eavesdropping
on private communication, i.e., the risk usually does not even justify advanced
conventional security hardware.
In an intermediate approach – without a quantum internet – users could
exchange secure key using QKD in mobile devices with a terminal at their bank
or other trusted organization. This key could later be used to authenticate and
encrypt communication via the internet and thereby enable a greatly improved
communication security. The idea is somehow similar to one time transaction
authentication numbers (TANs) as used today only that the key length could be
much longer (the necessity to type the key by hand drops) and the secure quantum
distribution replaces the TAN letter. The development of such hand held QKD
systems started already in 2006 [121] and with recent advances in wave guide optics
becomes more and more feasible.
The cost-benefit analysis appears much different for the security of professional
systems. Today, almost every day attacks on the information infrastructure of huge
companies, universities and even governments are reported. Even more alarming are
intrusions into systems controlling critical infrastructure like power grids, pipelines,
offshore platforms, air traffic control or the railway network. Here, vulnerabilities
in the data communication can possibly claim many human lives and most secure
network infrastructure is indicated.
Indeed, QKD can improve the robustness of these delicate systems against attacks
by providing unconditionally secure symmetric keys. Moreover, the results of this
work proof QKD to be a feasible technology for mobile applications, too. Not only
can the connection to the aircraft itself be secured. Regarding the flying unit as a
trusted node allows to distribute key material in varying scenarios on a continental
range. In some cases, especially when integrated with unmanned aircraft, free space
QKD may also be cost effective compared to very expensive dark fibers.
Of course, QKD to and between satellites remains the grand goal for global secure
communication. In fact, the conditions aboard a satellite in some respects are
even advantageous compared to the aircraft scenario in the presented experiment:
First, the trajectory of a satellite is usually known precisely and a second benefit
is the absence of vibrations aboard a satellite which were severe in the presented
scenario. Thereby, the pointing and tracking will be facilitated on both ends of the
quantum channel. Moreover, the polarization rotations emerging from the satellite’s
orientation are deterministic and their compensation can be improved iteratively due
to the repeating nature of its track.
With the successful polarization compensation in this highly dynamic demon-
stration and the observed attenuation comparable to the values anticipated in
a LEO down link, this experiment constitutes a major milestone on the way to
unconditionally secure communication on a global scale.
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Abbreviations
ADC analog to digital converter
AES advanced encryption standard
APD avalanche photo diode
CPA coarse pointing assembly
cw continuous wave
DAC digital to analog converter
DLR German Aerospace Center
(Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V.)
DSP digital signal processor
ECL emitter coupled logic
FELT2 free-space experimental laser terminal 2
FoV field of view
FPA fine pointing assembly
FPGA field-programmable gate array
FSO free-space optical
FSO free-space optical
FWHM full-width at half-maximum
GEO geosynchronous orbit
GPS global positioning system
IC integrated circuit
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IMU inertial measurement unit
ISS international space station
LDPC low density parity check
LEO low earth orbit
LFSR linear feedback shift register
LVPECL low-voltage positive emitter-coupled logic
OGS optical ground station
PRBS pseudo random bit Sequence
QBER quantum bit error ratio
QKD quantum key distribution
RTC real time clock
SNR signal to noise ratio
STD standard deviation
TAN transaction authentication number
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UHF ultra high frequency
VFR visual flight rules
WCP weak coherent pulse
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